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I. INTRODUCTION 
Tax loopholes are an accepted, almost sacred part of 
government taxation.  Rational taxpayers seek to minimize the 
amount that they owe to the government by learning the intricacies 
of the tax code, including the loopholes.1  Complex regulatory 
programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and other public benefits 
programs similarly are characterized by intricate regulations 
inevitably containing loopholes that program participants may use 
to their advantage.2  As a matter of individual wealth or profit 
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 1. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, The Loophole Artist, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Dec. 21, 2003, at 18 (discussing Jonathan Blattmachr, a partner at Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, whose career is built on finding tax code loopholes); 
Allan Sloan, Tax Tricks: No Matter How Many Tax Loopholes Get Closed, 
Corporate America Always Seem to Find New Ones; This Time It’s ‘Cash Rich 
Split-offs,’ NEWSWEEK BUS., Oct. 26, 2004 (“When it comes to creating the most-
efficient manufacturing plants or fuel-efficient cars, we in the United States 
still lag behind other countries.  But when it comes to creating tax-efficient 
corporate transactions, we continue to lead the world.”), at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6337705/site/newsweek; Kaja Whitehouse, Learn 
the Ropes, and Loopholes, for Gifts to Family, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at D2 
(recommending that “[i]f you plan to give assets to family members this holiday 
season, keep in mind the tax rules and loopholes that can guide your giving”); 
Welcome to Diane Kennedy’s Tax Loopholes (advertising that the “full service 
CPA firm develops legal tax solutions for your unique circumstances that will 
dramatically reduce your taxes”), at http://www.taxloopholes.com (last visited 
Nov. 21,  2005). 
 2. See, e.g., Sarah Lueck, Creative Accounting for Medicaid: Bush Budget 
Proposal Targets Loopholes That States Use to Garner More Federal Funds, 
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 24, 2005, at A4 (quoting the head of the Alabama Medicaid 
program who suggested that the state’s success in garnering federal funding by 
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maximization, it seems irrational for a taxpayer, health care 
provider, or welfare beneficiary not to take advantage of regulatory 
loopholes as long as the potential gains outweigh the potential losses 
or liability.  But widespread use of loopholes may come to be 
regarded as unfair or “cheating.”  In addition, allowing individuals 
and businesses to take advantage of unintended loopholes can 
distort regulatory incentives and result in misallocation of 
government resources. 
The public and government respond to the existence of loopholes 
inconsistently.  Sometimes loopholes remain open and become 
accepted as part of the regulatory scheme, along with the 
affirmative regulations.  Other times, public pressure, shifting 
priorities, policy trends, or reform efforts drive the government to 
crack down on longstanding “sacred cows.”3  Because individuals 
and businesses come to rely on loopholes as part of the institutional 
structure under which they operate, regulators should take care and 
apply the same measured, rational, cost-benefit analysis in closing 
longstanding loopholes as applied in promulgating new rules.  When 
regulators do not approach closing loopholes deliberately but instead 
react to public perceptions of “cheating,” the response may 
exacerbate rather than remedy the perceived problem. 
This Article provides a detailed case study, in the Medicare 
 
taking advantage of Medicaid loopholes “is exactly what all of us do when we do 
our income taxes every year: We looked at the law and used the law to our 
advantage.”); Robert Pear, Health Secretary Calls for Medicaid Changes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at A12 (quoting new Health & Human Services Secretary 
Michael O. Leavitt who announced sweeping changes to Medicaid and observed 
that “[r]ight now, many older Americans take advantage of Medicaid loopholes 
to become eligible for Medicaid by giving away assets to their children”); Ellen 
E. Schultz & Theo Francis, U.S. Drug Subsidy Benefits Employers, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 8, 2004, at A3 (describing a “little-noticed provision,” or loophole, in the 
new Medicare prescription drug law that allows employers to collect a federal 
subsidy based on both employer and retiree expenditures); see also Editorial, 
The Real Tenet Scandal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2002, at A14 (discussing the 
pervasiveness of Medicare loopholes); Editorial, Tenet’s Shareholder Ills, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at A10 (“After all, Tenet wasn’t doing anything illegal in 
profiting from Medicare’s infinite flaws, and it could have continued to do so in 
the many months it will take for the bureaucracy to churn out yet a new 
regulation.”). 
 3. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Gauging the Cost of a Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 2004, at B8 (observing that tax reform will likely require the 
administration to attack two “sacred cows,” namely deductions for mortgage 
interest and charitable contributions or “do an exceptional job of removing 
almost every other loophole”); see also Lueck, supra note 2, at A4 (“When the 
nation’s governors go to the White House on Monday, they are likely to deliver a 
blunt message to President Bush: Keep your hands off our Medicaid 
loopholes.”). 
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context, of public pressure to close loopholes distorting market 
incentives and regulatory program design and proposes certain 
measures to prevent similar results in the future.  Drawing on 
behavioral law and economics literature, this Article examines the 
post-Enron experience of Tenet Healthcare Corporation, a 
prominent for-profit health care provider.  Before Enron, market 
watchers generally praised Tenet for its efficiency and innovations 
in for-profit health care delivery, a model that was becoming 
increasingly important as health care policymakers urged 
privatization as a way to address skyrocketing health care costs.  
But after Enron, the public grew suspicious of profitability and 
looked for alternative explanations for high earnings.  In Tenet’s 
case, the alternate explanation was a special payment adjustment 
under the Medicare program—the outlier “loophole.” 
II. RISK PERCEPTION AND REGULATION 
In the unique post-Enron culture, the public may have 
overestimated the risks posed by corporate competition and 
strategic conduct, including use of longstanding loopholes.  The 
result, particularly in the health care context, damaged the industry 
and ultimately harmed consumers.  The phenomena of the public’s 
judgment errors and other misperceptions of relevant risks 
distorting government priorities are well documented.4  In 
particular, people may overestimate the threat posed by a particular 
business practice or private conduct.  They may clamor for new 
regulations or legislative changes based on high-profile, especially 
salient, or readily “available” examples of a perceived problem.  But 
the public may inaccurately perceive the risk and fail to 
comprehensively appreciate the consequences of government 
intervention.5  The resulting legislation may be “bad policy” in terms 
 
 4. The literature on behavioral law and economics, casting doubt on the 
classical “rational actor” economic model, is ample.  See, e.g., Chrstine Jolls et 
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & 
ECONOMICS 14 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter Jolls et al., in 
SUNSTEIN] (noting that there are “three important ‘bounds’ on human behavior 
[i.e., bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest] that 
draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable preferences, 
rational expectations, and optimal processing of information”); Christine Jolls et 
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 
(1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach] (noting, before 
Sunstein’s book, that “[t]he task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, 
is to explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for 
the law.  How do ‘real people’ differ from homo economicus?”). 
 5. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (defining “availability heuristic” as 
“a pervasive mental shortcut whereby the perceived likelihood of any given 
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of promoting efficiency or reducing risks.6  Scholars propose various 
solutions to problems of judgment-error risk regulation, including 
“rationalizing” bureaucracy and creating a group of civil servants 
insulated from public pressure with special expertise and authority 
to work across agency lines.7 
A clear example of the public’s judgment errors distorting 
regulatory agendas and potentially producing more harm than good 
occurred in late 2000 and early 2001 following the widely reported 
sagas of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and other 
unprecedented corporate accounting scandals, management 
malfeasance, and bankruptcy filings.8  The public’s post-Enron 
 
event is tied to the ease with which its occurrence can be brought to mind,” 
describing “availability cascades,” and stating that “resulting mass delusions 
may last indefinitely and . . . produce wasteful or even detrimental laws and 
policies”); see also Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative 
Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 
966 (2004) (describing Kuran and Sunstein’s availability theory as that “which 
refers to the tendency of people to think that events are more likely to occur 
than the statistics suggest because they can recall past examples of such 
events”).  See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of 
Private Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) (discussing the effect of 
judgment errors in arbitral decisionmaking). 
 6. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 10-11 (1993) (suggesting that regulatory priorities 
are not based on rational cost-benefit analysis but plagued by judgment errors, 
principally tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and inconsistency); Jolls et 
al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1518 (“When beliefs and 
preferences are produced by a set of probability judgments, made inaccurate by 
the availability heuristic, legislation will predictably become anecdote-driven.”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 
1059 (2000) (advocating cost-benefit analysis to not only promote economic 
efficiency but also correct judgment errors). 
 7. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 6, at 55-63 (proposing to attack the 
“vicious circle at its weakest point, the regulatory link, and to change the 
circle’s dynamics”). 
 8. See, e.g., Ken Brown, Company Blowups Abound, Rebounds Rare, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at R2 (noting that “in 2002, with every major sector . . . 
down, the standouts are the train wrecks, such as WorldCom Inc., Tyco 
International Ltd., and Adelphia Communications Corp”); Verne Kopytoff, Year 
in Review, Annus Horribilis; Corporate Scandals, Lingering Recession Made 
2002 Truly Horrible Year, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 2002, at G1 (listing business 
episodes during 2002); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory 
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 
J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2002) (noting that the “spectacular crashes and frauds of 
Enron, WorldCom, and other companies, including Sunbeam, Waste 
Management, Adelphia, Xerox, and Global Crossing” have reinvigorated debate 
about government regulation of corporations and efficient market theory); Note, 
The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
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enthusiasm for regulation of private industry invigorated 
lawmakers, who passed new laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.9  
Regulators responded to the mounting public pressure by adjusting 
enforcement priorities, attacking previously overlooked loopholes, 
and fast-tracking new policies.  The resulting quick fixes, however, 
failed to fully consider long-term market risks and, in some cases, 
deterred otherwise beneficial business innovations and practices. 
Health care providers were not spared from the post-Enron 
corporate clean-up campaign.  Long-recognized practices and 
notorious loopholes suddenly came under scrutiny, causing health 
care providers to react and retool existing business models and 
strategies in ways that reduced their own revenue and, ultimately, 
the availability of medical services generally.10  The American health 
care system is an instructive context for examining the problems of 
agencies regulating in response to public pressure instead of 
deliberately weighing the costs and benefits of a particular policy.11  
Health care regulation in the United States is tricky because of the 
dual markets for medical care.  Health care is paid for by both 
private dollars, through employer health plans and private 
 
2123, 2123 (2003) [hereinafter Note, The Good, the Bad] (listing recent 
corporate governance scandals). 
 9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see Larry E. Ribstein, 
SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 293 (2004) 
(describing the panic that lead to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as an example 
of “Sudden Acute Regulatory Syndrome” that follows market bubble bursts, in 
which “investor heuristics . . . support unreasonable pessimism about markets 
and optimism about regulation” and noting that “[f]raud becomes the media 
story of the day, magnified through the ‘availability’ heuristic”). 
 10. See, e.g., Nina Owcharenko, Congress Should Get Serious About 
Medicaid, HERITAGE FOUND. POL’Y RES. & ANALYSIS (Mar. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm705.cfm  
 11. See BREYER, supra note 6, at 57 (noting that, among other factors, the 
“[c]ongressional tendency to respond quickly and directly to public perceptions   
. . . all work[s] against the development of a more systematic, coordinated 
approach to regulating risks”); Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966 (suggesting 
that cost-benefit analysis “prevents bad policies, which are policies whose costs, 
if enacted, would exceed their benefits”); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 
737 (noting that resisting public pressure, at times, is consistent with the ideal 
of deliberative democracy as “[a] principal point of the original Constitution was 
to ensure that representatives ‘refine and enlarge’ popular sentiment, rather 
than automatically translate it into law”); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1065-66 
(suggesting that, given the public’s judgment errors, “a highly responsive 
government is likely to blunder” and that “cost-benefit analysis should be taken 
not as undemocratic but, on the contrary, as a means of fortifying (properly 
specified) democratic goals, by ensuring that government decisions are 
responsive to well-informed public judgments”). 
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insurance, and government dollars, through programs like Medicare 
and Medicaid.12  An intricate web of regulations and incentives 
define the government health care programs.  Tugging on a strand 
to close one loophole risks unraveling another strand of regulations 
and private market incentives elsewhere in the system, 
compromising the overall scheme.13  Program changes must be made 
deliberately, not reactively, to avoid unintended results that 
endanger the nation’s overall health care system. 
Traditional law and economics theory operates from the premise 
that individuals act rationally to further their own individual self-
interest and, by so doing, increase the overall level of wealth in 
society.14  Behavioral law and economics questions the traditional 
 
 12. The United States government is the single largest purchaser of health 
care services in the country.  See, e.g., Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and 
Mismanagement:  Hearings Before the Task Force on Health of the House 
Comm. on the Budget, 106th Cong. 178 (2000) [hereinafter OIG Statement] 
(prepared statement of the Office of Inspector General, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs.) (stating that the Health Care Financing Administration is 
largest health care purchaser in the world); see also Thomas R. McLean, 
Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physician Extenders will Necessitate 
a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH 
MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 239, 255 (2002) (noting that the federal government is the 
largest purchaser of health care services).  The federal government also pays for 
health care for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (“FEHBP”) and 
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”).  States may also cover state employees’ 
health insurance and provide other welfare programs, including the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”). 
 13. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Shalala, 87 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“Medicare and Medicaid are enormously complicated programs.  The system is 
a web; a tug at one strand pulls on every other.”); cf. Am. Lithotripsy Soc’y v. 
Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (D.D.C. 1992) (“The Court lacks the expertise 
to decide whether or not agency action, especially in fields as arcane and 
specialized as Medicare law and medical procedures, is reasonable, unless it has 
the benefit of adversarial discussion in the rulemaking record.  Similarly, the 
agency itself cannot function properly without having the benefit of such 
comments before it makes any final decisions.”). 
 14. Modern microeconomic theory suggests that, as individuals or firms 
undertake to increase their own self-worth, they increase wealth for society 
overall.  See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A 
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 1, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 
1980) (“Since Adam Smith, we have known that the profit-seeking activity of 
the butcher and baker ensures results beneficial to all members of the 
community.”); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. IV, ch. II, 484-85 
(Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 2000) (1776) (noting that the 
individual “neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much 
he is promoting it[,] . . . and[,] by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention”). 
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assumptions, drawing on empirical evidence demonstrating how 
people “really” act.15  That evidence suggests that people do not 
always act rationally, seeking to maximize utility from a stable set 
of preferences, based on optimal information and other inputs.16  The 
literature identifies three “bounds” on human behavior—bounded 
rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest—to 
explain how “real people” differ from the paradigmatic rational 
actor.17  The public’s over-reaction and regulators’ flawed responses 
in the wake of Enron and similar high-profile episodes demonstrate 
the first bound—bounded rationality. 
 Bounded rationality describes the obvious limits on human 
cognitive abilities.  We are not omnipotent or perfectly intellectually 
adept.  Given our limited brain power, we rely on mental shortcuts 
and rules of thumb, which are rational strategies in terms of 
economizing thinking time.  But those remedies can lead to 
judgments that differ markedly from what would be expected under 
the rational actor model.18  One shortcut, or heuristic, involves 
estimating the likelihood of a particular event based on how easy it 
is to recall similar instances, i.e., the availability of other examples 
of the same event.19  The “availability heuristic” causes people to 
conclude that an event is more likely to occur if they have recently 
witnessed a similar occurrence than if they do not have a recent 
example to draw on.20  But still, the likelihood of an event occurring 
based on availability may differ markedly from predictions based on 
 
 15. See Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1471 (noting 
that “[e]conomic analysis of law usually proceeds under the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics.  But empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt 
these assumptions.”); see also BREYER, supra note 6, at 35-36 (describing several 
examples that psychologists have identified as impeding rational 
understanding); Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966–97 (summarizing Sunstein’s 
identified “predictable problems in individual and social cognition,” meaning 
the “heuristics that cognitive psychologists have identified as producing 
systematic biases in human decisionmaking, as well as the social dynamics that 
can cause group decisionmaking to err”).  See generally Jolls et al., in SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 4, at 13-58 (providing an overview of the behavioral approach). 
 16. Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4 at 1476 (summarizing 
Gary Becker’s description of standard economic principles). 
 17. Id. at 1476-77 (noting that each bound “represents a significant way in 
which most people depart from the standard economic model” and recognizing 
that “[a]ll three bounds are well documented in the literature of other” 
disciplines but not economics). 
 18. Id. at 1477-78; see also BREYER, supra note 6, at 35 (suggesting that 
rules of thumb and other departures from “rational” decisionmaking “may have 
helped us survive as we lived throughout much of prehistory, in small groups of 
hunter-gatherers, depending upon grain, honey, and animals for sustenance”). 
 19. Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1477. 
 20. Id. 
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unbiased information.  Drawing on “availability” to predict risks can 
produce judgment errors.21  People “overestimate the number of 
deaths from highly publicized events (motor vehicle accidents, 
tornados, floods, botulism) but underestimate the number from less 
publicized sources (stroke, heart disease, stomach cancer).”22  Those 
availability errors can be costly for society by directing resources 
and regulation toward the perceived risks, away from the risks that 
are, in reality, more serious. 
As individuals interact in society, their judgments and biases 
tend to influence others’ perceptions.  When one person 
communicates, through words or actions, his or her individual risk 
assessment of an event, he or she provides information on which 
others may base their judgments.  As more and more people rely on 
that data to develop and express their perceptions, the availability 
of the example in the public’s mind increases, leading to an 
“availability cascade.”23  The classic example of an availability 
cascade is the Love Canal example, in which residents expressed 
concerns about the health effects from a nearby hazardous waste 
dump to their neighbors, others in the region, and the nation though 
media and other widely disseminated reports.  The perceived Love 
Canal threat led to mass relocations and, eventually, passage of the 
Superfund statute, despite the absence of any good scientific 
evidence validating residents’ initial safety concerns.24 
The social processes that produce availability cascades include 
informational and reputational cascades.  When people lack 
adequate private information about a particular danger or risk, they 
rely heavily on information and data communicated from others.  
 
 21. Id. at 1477-78. 
 22. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1065. 
 23. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 685 (suggesting that the 
availability heuristic “interacts with identifiable social mechanisms to generate 
availability cascades—social cascades, or simply cascades, through which 
expressed perceptions trigger chains of individual responses that make these 
perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in 
public discourse”); see also Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966-67 (describing the 
availability cascade as “a vicious cycle in which an event leads individuals to 
overestimate a risk, in turn affecting public discourse, which then exacerbates 
the initial overestimation”). 
 24. See Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 967 (describing Kuran and Sunstein’s 
Love Canal example, “in which residents’ concerns about environmental 
contamination from a toxic waste dump snowballed” despite the “relatively 
small risk” actually posed by toxic waste dumps); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 
5, at 691-98 (detailing the Love Canal episode as an example of costly 
availability error and describing others, e.g., Alar pesticide, which led to the 
plummeting demand for apples, and the TWA Flight 800 crash, which led to the 
creation of the White House Commission on Aviation, Safety, and Security). 
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For example, if someone living close to a hazardous waste site 
perceives an increased risk of cancer associated with the site, a 
person living far away, lacking direct experience with hazardous 
waste, may go along with the belief.25  As more and more people 
come to accept a certain belief simply because they think other 
people accept it, an informational cascade results.  Reputational 
concerns also affect how people perceive and express their beliefs.  
The desire to earn social approval or avoid disapproval may lead a 
person to express certain popularly held views while not sharing 
dissenting views.26  An individual may be reluctant to express 
doubts about the perceived risk in the face of a consensus because 
the dissenter fears being seen as indifferent or uncaring if most 
others are upset, or being seen as cowardly or confused if most 
others are unconcerned.27 
Availability cascades may be stoked by “availability 
entrepreneurs.”  Availability entrepreneurs are individuals, 
government officials, media, nonprofit organizations, businesses, 
and other interested parties who understand the dynamics of 
availability cascades and attempt to trigger cascades to advance 
their own interests.28  By drawing the public’s attention to a 
particular problem, event, or example, availability entrepreneurs 
attempt to drum up support for specific reforms.  For example, 
environmental organizations drew attention to examples such as 
Love Canal or Chernobyl to gather support for environmental 
legislation, such as Superfund.29  Similarly, competitors or 
consumers could point to Enron and similar incidences of 
managerial malfeasance to gather support for new corporate 
 
 25. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 720 (describing informational 
cascades and noting that most people form risk judgments and policy 
preferences through very limited information); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1066 
(describing the process by which one person’s statement creates an 
“informational externality,” or signal, that proves relevant data to others and 
leads to an informational cascade). 
 26. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 727-30 (discussing reputational 
and other social pressures that cause individuals to tailor public expressions to 
public expectations); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1067 (noting that reputational 
concerns, fueled by the availability heuristic, may lead the public to demand 
regulation for risks that are relatively low while ignoring relatively high 
magnitude risks). 
 27. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1067 (“If many people are alarmed about 
some risk, you may not voice your doubts about whether the alarm is merited, 
simply in order not to seem obtuse, cruel, or indifferent.  And if many people 
believe that a certain risk is trivial, you may not disagree through words or 
deeds, lest you appear cowardly or confused.”). 
 28. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 687. 
 29. Id. at 687-88 (describing availability entrepreneurs). 
W06-WEEKS VERSION 2.DOC 12/6/2005  10:18 AM 
1224 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
responsibility laws, such as Sarbanes-Oxley.  Availability campaigns 
may benefit society by focusing attention on long-festering but 
ignored problems; however, they also can be harmful by redirecting 
societal resources to relatively trivial concerns. 
As the Superfund example illustrates, setting regulatory 
priorities based on available examples and availability cascades, 
instead of on unbiased data on the actual probability of certain 
occurrences, may result in resource misallocation, or “bad policies.”30  
Superfund is “bad policy” in the sense that critics view it as one of 
the most expensive and least effective environmental statutes, given 
the relatively small risk posed by toxic waste.31  In addition to 
producing too much or inappropriate regulation, availability 
cascades may produce legislation that fails to reduce, or actually 
increases, the same type of risks sought to be reduced or exacerbates 
problems elsewhere.32 
Similarly, public perceptions and regulatory responses that led 
to Sarbanes-Oxley and similar laws passed in the post-Enron era 
demonstrate the “bad policy” that judgment biases and cascade 
effects tend to produce.  In an already falling market, highly salient 
and widely publicized examples of corporate fraud led the public to 
overestimate the relevant risks and push for legislation that further 
cooled the economy.33  As one critic noted, “[r]evelations of corporate 
fraud coincided with public anxiety over the economy and populist 
sentiments condemning the insiders who took great wealth out of 
now-fallen companies.”34  Just like the Love Canal example, the 
media contributed to the cascade effect by continuously reporting 
and reinforcing the available examples of corporate fraud, even 
 
 30. See Abramowicz, supra note 5, at 966 (defining “bad policies” as 
“policies whose costs, if enacted, would exceed their benefits”). 
 31. See id. at 967 (noting critics’ views of Superfund); Kuran & Sunstein, 
supra note 5, at 697-98 (noting the negligible health risk posed by Superfund 
sites, compared with other risks, and suggesting that had resources devoted to 
Superfund been devoted to other risks, “there could have been major benefits as 
measured in, say, life-years saved”). 
 32. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1068-70 (noting the problem of “health-
health trade-offs,” deriving from the fact that the public and regulators tend to 
“bracket” risks rather than appreciating systemic effects and recommending 
cost-benefit analysis as solution); see also BREYER, supra note 6, at 22 
(discussing several examples of regulators ignoring the external effect of one 
intervention on another problem and suggesting the need for inter-program 
coordination). 
 33. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 46-48 (discussing the role of the 
availability heuristic in shaping public perceptions, ultimately leading to the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 34. Id. at 46. 
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suggesting a unifying, ongoing saga to draw in readers.35  
Availability entrepreneurs, including the targeted corporations’ 
competitors, market analysts, fund managers, lawyers, regulators, 
and other interest groups also played a role, directing the public’s 
attention and scrutiny toward unusually profitable companies or 
firms that continued to thrive even in the post-bubble market.  
Reacting to public outrage and seeking distance from unseemly Wall 
Street profiteers, Congress quickly passed new laws and regulators 
announced sweeping new fraud initiatives.  But in so doing, 
lawmakers failed to adequately balance the costs and benefits of the 
reforms, including long-term market effects.36 
Tenet’s experience in the aftermath of Enron provides a clear 
example of the confluence of judgment errors, availability cascades, 
and misguided policy reform.  Enron and other companies provided 
readily available examples of apparently innovative and highly 
successful companies that, upon further examination, turned out to 
have derived their remarkably high profits not from astute business 
practices but rather from fraudulent schemes or questionable 
transactions.  Likewise, the public and market analysts had viewed 
Tenet as a productive model of private, for-profit medicine. But that 
positive perception shifted rapidly in the post-Enron era.  In the 
context of Enron and other corporate scandals, the public easily 
accepted the intimations of availability entrepreneurs that Tenet 
derived its high revenues not from legitimate market strategies but 
from shady dealings—in particular, exploiting Medicare loopholes. 
To the extent that the public was already leery of the idea of a 
company making a profit from providing medical treatment, Tenet’s 
aggressive strategies and robust earnings confirmed suspicions and 
drew scrutiny.  But the risks associated with competition and profit-
motivation in health care delivery may not be as great as the public 
perceived.  The reforms demanded of health care providers, 
generally, and Tenet, in particular, in the post-Enron era squelched 
some private market innovations.  Those strategies could have 
offered solutions to persistent problems of access, quality, efficiency, 
and cost containment in health care delivery.  Under the Bush 
Administration’s trend toward privatization of traditional welfare 
 
 35. Id. at 47 (suggesting that “media’s profit incentive to sell the story of 
corporate fraud as a continuing saga of wrongdoing that readers or viewers 
follow everyday rather than as discrete events”). 
 36. See id. at 47 (noting that “the hasty adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in the midst of a stock market crash was even less conducive to careful 
weighing of costs and benefits than the circumstances surrounding typical 
legislation”); Ribstein, supra note 9, at 293 (suggesting that “voters and 
politicians looking for a quick fix to market ills may ignore regulation’s long-
term risks to markets”). 
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programs, the existence of the reliable, competitive, private market 
strategies on which to draw as models for government programs will 
be essential to the success of any reforms.37 
III. TENET CASE STUDY 
Tenet Healthcare achieved market prominence through a 
variety of innovative and successful strategies.  Aspects of Tenet’s 
business model also allowed the company to collect special payments 
from Medicare, the federal health care program for the elderly and 
disabled.38  Although Tenet does not appear to have violated 
Medicare program rules or guidance in collecting those special 
payments, the post-Enron public distrusted profitability and pointed 
to the special Medicare payments as an alternate, illegitimate 
source of Tenet’s success.  Tenet’s rise and fall highlights the costly 
effects of regulating the complex American health care delivery 
system based on public risk perceptions.   
Public outrage over the Medicare loophole and other perceived 
abuses pushed Tenet to abandon various successful business 
strategies.  Regulators scrambled to respond to the public by 
cracking down on providers garnering extra revenue through a well-
known, longstanding loophole in the Medicare payment system.  
Society paid dearly in both administrative resources expended and 
in the loss of potentially instructive health care delivery 
innovations.  Instead, had health care regulators been given space to 
deliberate and assess the systemic effects of any proposed changes, 
more pressing regulatory flaws may have been identified and 
addressed to the benefit of the overall system. 
Tenet is the second largest hospital holding company in the 
United States, after Hospital Corporation of America, or HCA.39  
When the Enron story hit newsstands, Tenet owned 114 facilities 
across the country, concentrated in the West and Southwest.40  
 
 37. See Jackie Calmes, In Bush’s ‘Ownership Society,’ Citizens Would Take 
More Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2005, at A1 (describing President Bush’s 
“ownership society” that would fundamentally alter New Deal and Great 
Society welfare reforms by requiring citizens to bear greater financial risk and 
responsibility, including moving Medicare and Medicaid to the “share-the-risk 
model of group insurance . . . in which individuals shop for health care much 
like anything else, seeking the best prices and products among competing 
providers”). 
 38. Reed Abelson, U.S. to Review Big Payments for Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2002, at A1. 
 39. See Neil Weinberg, Healing Thyself, FORBES, Mar. 17, 2003, at 64 
(discussing the two corporations’ relative market shares). 
 40. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Tenet Receives 
Subpoenas Regarding Relocation Agreements (July 15, 2003), at http:// 
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Tenet rose to market prominence by employing aggressive, 
competitive, for-profit strategies that were relatively unfamiliar to 
medical services providers.41  By all accounts, Tenet was a model for-
profit health care company, in the classic model of a rational profit-
maximizing firm.  For a time, analysts and policymakers touted 
Tenet specifically, and proprietary hospitals generally, as the salve 
for the broken American health care system.42  Eventually, however, 
Tenet and hospitals employing similar strategies were “vilified as 
greedy and corrupt.”43  Tenet’s once-touted practices drew scrutiny 
and renewed underlying discomfort and skepticism about the 
appropriateness of profiting off of sickness, death, and need. 
A. Tenet’s Rise 
 Until October 2002, by all objective measures, Tenet was “a 
Wall Street darling,”44 hailed as a successful, efficient competitor 




 41. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at R2 (noting that Tenet “had been an 
investor’s darling because of its solid fundamentals and strong growth”); 
Weinberg, supra note 39, at 64 (noting that “HCA was a free-market crusader, 
growing feverishly by acquisition and dazzling Wall Street”).  Cf. Bernard 
Wysocki Jr., To Fix Health Care, Hospitals Take Tips From Factory Floor, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 9, 2004, at A1 (discussing trend of hospitals’ adopting production 
techniques from automotive assembly lines). 
 42. Laurence Darmiento, Prescription for Profit: Tenet Healthcare Boosts 
Revenues, Influence by Adding Patient Services, L.A. BUS. J., Apr. 15-21, 2002, 
at 1 (quoting the chief of staff whom Tenet recruited away from a neighboring 
non-profit hospital regarding Tenet’s “bare bones” efficiency demands: “They 
run it like a business and in this day medicine has to be run like a business.”); 
Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare, After Cleaning House, Seeks Purchases: 
Company Now Posting Record Cash Flow, Is a Bidder on Four Big Hospitals, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2001, at B6 (noting that Tenet sought to acquire hospitals 
in financial trouble, “a plight that characterizes more than a third of the 
nation’s 5,000 hospitals” and that “hospitals’ woes come at a time when ‘we 
[Tenet] have a lot of capital to put to work’”) (quoting Tenet officer in charge of 
acquisitions); Charles Yoo, Tenet Stopping Bleeding at South Fulton Medical, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 11, 2002, at E6 (“For now, the bleeding has stopped at 
South Fulton, thanks to privatization—the CPR that brought back the hospital 
from the brink of death.”). 
 43. Weinberg, supra note 39, at 64 (regarding HCA); id. at 65 (discussing 
allegations against Tenet for over-billing federal health care programs); see, e.g., 
Kopytoff, supra note 8, at G1 (“Revelations about Tenet Healthcare painted a 
picture of a company that specialized in high prices.”). 
 44. Darmiento, supra note 42 (describing Tenet as “the envy of the 
industry” and “a Wall Street darling”); Yoo, supra note 42, at 1 (quoting an 
Emory University health policy professor: “ [Tenet] ha[s] been Wall Street’s 
darlings.  Their revenues are way up.”). 
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growth45 in an otherwise weak economy.46  Tenet focused on core 
operations in acute-care hospitals.47  The company abandoned its old 
vertical integration model by reducing satellite operations, such as 
dialysis, home health, physician practices, and health plans.48  The 
strategy shifted to horizontal integration in key markets by 
acquiring struggling hospitals,49 including community hospitals,50 
 
 45. Tenet’s Profit Rises 30%, Beating Forecasts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2001, at 
C2 [hereinafter Beating Forecasts] (quoting bank analyst: “The quarter was 
truly spectacular by any measure”); Barbara Kirchheimer, Greater 
Expectations: Tenet Says It Will Beat Street’s Earnings Estimates, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, June 18, 2001, at 46 (quoting Advest analyst regarding Tenet’s 
particularly strong quarterly increase in admissions: “It’s a pleasant surprise, 
but not a shock . . . .  The company has been doing very well for quite a while.”); 
Andy Pasztor, Tenet Profit Climbs 41% to $280 Million, and Full-Year Forecast 
Is Boosted Again, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at B10 (quoting a Lehman Brothers 
analyst’s observation that “Tenet shares still ‘continue to have a lot of sizzle’ 
because of the company’s reputation for tight management”); The Money Gang: 
Stock of the Day: Tenet Healthcare (CNNfn television broadcast) (Oct. 2, 2002) 
[hereinafter The Money Gang] (“This is where we tap dance about Tenet 
Healthcare.”); see also James Bandler, Jump in Operating Profit Linked to 
Stronger Pricing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2001, at B9 (“Tenet . . .  expected earnings 
per share to significantly exceed analysts’ expectations.”). 
 46. See Don Lee, Tenet Says Earnings Will Top Estimates, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2002, at C2 (noting that Tenet “has outperformed the overall hospital 
sector” and “has been beating analysts’ expectations”); Jeff D. Opdyke & 
Michelle Higgins, Will You Get a Bonus This Year?  Surprisingly, Some 
Companies Are Paying More Than Last Year, But Wall Street and Tech Suffer, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2002, at D1 (noting that Tenet already paid higher 
bonuses than previous year “after racking up profits of more than $1 billion for 
fiscal 2002, . . . an increase of more than 50% from a year ago”); The Money 
Gang, supra note 45 (summing up investors’ attitude toward Tenet as: “I want 
to own this stock.  Because most everything on Wall Street I don’t want to own 
right now.”). 
 47. Pasztor, supra note 45, at B10 (quoting Tenet CEO Jeffrey C. Barbakow 
as saying that Tenet is reaping the benefits of “years spent developing a strong 
portfolio of hospitals and honing our internal processes”); The Money Gang, 
supra, note 45 (attributing strong performance, in part, to the “shift in [Tenet’s] 
business mix to acute care services” and “divest[ing] non-core businesses”). 
 48. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet “got out of a half dozen 
sidelights . . . [to] focus on its core business of running hospitals”); The Money 
Gang, supra note 45 (“This is a company that’s benefited in a significant way 
from paring the non-core businesses, the physician practices, the health plans, 
home health operations, etc cetera [sic].”). 
 49. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet opened a competing heart 
hospital near a lagging facility with a second-rate cardiology program, recruited 
a competitor’s cardiology chief of staff, and eventually purchased the competitor 
outright); Rundle, supra note 42, at B6 (noting that target hospitals are all in 
financial trouble, facing operating losses or break-even results, labor costs due 
to nursing shortage, and a lack of capital to invest in improved facilities and 
new technology). 
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non-profit facilities,51 and academic medical centers.  With these 
takeovers, Tenet was praised for its turnaround successes,52 
emphasis on efficiency,53 and improved staff relations.54  Horizontal 
integration also allowed Tenet to increase its market share,55 which 
strength the company parlayed into favorable contract negotiations 
with commercial insurers and managed care companies.56  Tenet 
was able to command “strong”57 and “robust”58 prices because of its 
market control and the overall high demand for its services. 
 
 50. Yoo, supra note 42 (discussing Tenet’s acquisition of vital community 
hospital for three growing cities and noting that “[n]ow that the hospital is no 
longer tax-exempt, it has become a new source of income for [one of the cities]”). 
 51. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that one physician was worried about 
going from non-profit to for-profit setting); id. (discussing a University of 
Southern California professor’s concern that Tenet’s take-over of a not-for-profit 
hospital would compromise charity care but concluding that “Tenet is not quite 
the bad operator he feared”); Rundle, supra note 42 (according to a UBS 
Warburg analyst: “Tenet’s low-key takeover of the Philadelphia system shows 
that the relationship between not-for-profits and the investor-owned companies 
is less adversarial than it was five years ago.”). 
 52. Yoo, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet is “known for buying ailing 
hospitals and turning them around”). 
 53. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting Tenet’s “reputation as a cost cutter 
and consolidator”). 
 54. Yoo, supra note 42 (citing improved morale among doctors and nurses 
and quoting a physician staff president: “I think the main challenge [for Tenet] 
is that you have to create trust.  You have to say that we’re here for a long run 
and we’re here to turn this place around, getting back to top quality care.”); The 
Money Gang, supra note 45 (concluding that Tenet has been “on the forefront of 
aggressively managing labor trends” and “getting at employee turnover and 
nurse satisfaction”).  But see Darmiento, supra note 42 (discussing labor 
troubles from a nurses union and quoting a union representative’s concern that 
“Tenet’s well known hostility to registered nurses and hospital staff forming 
unions hurts patients and workers alike”). 
 55. Rundle, supra note 42 (quoting Tenet’s chief corporate officer in charge 
of acquisitions: “We need to grow our share in markets that we’re in . . . .”); The 
Money Gang, supra note 45 (noting that Tenet “did a number of very astute 
things,” including “building these multi-facility networks and single markets 
that’s really contributed to substantial market concentration”). 
 56. Beating Forecasts, supra note 45 (observing strong growth in revenue, 
including increases in admissions and revenue-per-patient admission); 
Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Tenet “sought to gain regional market 
share that would give it bargaining power to extract higher payments from 
managed care insurers”); The Money Gang, supra note 45 (assessing that 
market concentration has “really turned into pricing power”). 
 57. Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (quoting CEO Barbakow on “the 
continuing phenomenon of strong pricing trends combined with strong 
admissions trends” as a “potent combination”). 
 58. Bandler, supra note 45 (noting that Tenet is “spurred by robust price 
increases”); Anne Marie Chaker, Converse Tech Sets Lower Estimates for 
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Tenet was also a savvy investor, pumping capital earnings back 
into physical facilities and new technology at its existing and newly 
acquired hospitals, thereby improving the quality of care.59  Tenet 
took advantage of its strong cash flow to significantly reduce its 
debt.60  Market prominence and ownership of multiple facilities in 
the same location allowed the company to improve efficiency and 
reduce duplication of services61 through bulk purchasing of supplies 
and acquiring new high-technology equipment for one hospital to 
serve several facilities in the same geographic region.62  Tenet’s 
strategy also included product differentiation, in particular, focusing 
on high reimbursement services, such as cardiology, orthopedics, 
and neurology.63  Commitment to acute-care facilities and high 
technology services positioned Tenet to meet the demands of the 
growing “baby boomer” sector of health care consumers.64  Improved 
 
Quarter, Year: Tenet Healthcare Corp., WALL ST. J., July 12, 2001, at B6 (noting 
that Tenet attributed earnings “to robust price increases and admissions”). 
 59. Pasztor, supra note 45 (noting Tenet’s “continued heavy investment to 
upgrade recently acquired hospitals”); Yoo, supra note 42 (noting Tenet’s 
acquisition of South Fulton Medical Center followed by $30 million worth of 
repairs and improvements, including replacing ceilings, painting walls, 
replacing duct-taped carpet with tile, buying new equipment for various 
medical departments, and expanding the emergency department); The Money 
Gang, supra note 45 (noting that Tenet expects to reinvest $1 billion in its 
hospitals this year). 
 60. Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (noting that Tenet paid off debt of 
$689 million for the fourth quarter and $1.5 billion for year); Lee, supra note 46, 
at C2 (attributing strong growth to reduced costs, including lower debt and 
interest payments). 
 61. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that Sister Carolita Hart, director of 
health affairs for the Los Angeles Archdiocese, became “convinced that [Tenet’s] 
centers of excellence strategy make sense in an era of competitive and costly 
health care.  ‘You really cannot afford to have services duplicated.’”). 
 62. Darmiento, supra note 42 (observing that Tenet “uses its heft to 
significantly lower purchasing costs for both routine supplies and advanced 
equipment, such as $1 million CT scanners”). 
 63. Id. (describing the strategy of establishing networks of hospitals that 
specialize in these services, dubbed regional “centers of excellence”); 
Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (noting a focus on these specialties); Rhonda 
L. Rundle, Tenet’s Net More Than Doubles; Earnings Projections are Boosted, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at D5 (noting that Tenet attributed its continued 
strong performance to various factors, including a “shift in its business mix to 
special acute-care services, such as cardiology, orthopedics and neurology,” 
which “generate higher revenue, and account for as much as one-half of unit 
revenue growth”). 
 64. Darmiento, supra note 42 (noting that while these services “are 
expensive to set up, the future payoff is assured, given the 83 million baby 
boomers are aged 37 to 54” and quoting Barbakow’s observation: “In your 50s 
you start using [cardiology, neurology, and orthopedic services] more than when 
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customer service was also part of the strategy.65  Increased hospital 
admissions demonstrated that Tenet was providing services that the 
market strongly demanded.66  
B. Weakley Report 
Perceptions of Tenet shifted radically based on a single Wall 
Street analyst’s report.  On October 28, 2002, Kenneth Weakley, a 
UBS Warburg health care analyst, raised questions about one 
aspect of Tenet’s government health care program reimbursement 
and downgraded the stock from “hold” to “reduce.”67  Weakley’s 
report demonstrated that Tenet’s revenue share attributable to a 
special payment under the Medicare program—the outlier 
adjustment—was considerably higher than the company’s 
competitors.68  As discussed more fully below, the Medicare 
reimbursement methodology provides an add-on or “bonus” for the 
cost of caring for unusually expensive patients.69  Weakley did not 
suggest that Tenet’s earnings were overstated but expressed concern 
that the company was overly dependent on Medicare outlier 
adjustments.70  In the prevailing climate of corporate scandals, 
accounting audits, congressional probes, and record-setting 
bankruptcy filings,71 Weakley’s report was sufficient to initiate a 
 
you are younger and it goes on from there.”); Rundle, supra note 42 (“Tenet says 
its hospital admissions in the critical 51-to-60-year-old age group rose 12% in 
the second half of last year.”); The Money Gang, supra note 45 (“Admission’s 
[sic] growth was highest among baby boomers age groups.”). 
 65. Kirchheimer, supra note 45, at 46 (noting a new “customer service 
initiative”); Yoo, supra note 42, at E6 (quoting an analyst’s observation that 
Tenet committed capital “in improving services and facilities overall to make 
them more appealing”). 
 66. Beating Forecasts, supra note 45, at C2 (noting analysts’ observations 
that significant investments in facilities and equipment helped attract patients 
to Tenet’s hospitals); Lee, supra note 46, at C2 (attributing strong revenue 
growth to “rising demand for more sophisticated and costly hospital services”); 
Rundle, supra note 42, at B6 (listing patient volumes and pricing as the two 
biggest revenue drivers); see also The Money Gang, supra note 45. 
 67. Laurence Darmiento, Questions about Billings, Medicare Charges Have 
Tenet Stock in a Dive, L.A. BUS. J., Nov. 4, 2002, at 3; Don Lee, Tenet Shares 
Tumble 14% After Downgrade; An Analyst’s Report Raises Questions About the 
Hospital Company’s Medicare Reimbursement and Whether it Can Sustain its 
Stellar Growth, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at C1. 
 68. See Darmiento, supra note 67. 
 69. See infra Part IV (describing Medicare payment methodology and 
outlier adjustments). 
 70. See Darmiento, supra note 67; see also Lee, supra note 67; Rhonda 
Rundle & Anna Wilde Mathews, Medicare Payments to Tenet Come Under 
Federal Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2002, at D4. 
 71. See Brown, supra note 8, at R2 (indicating that seven of the twelve 
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cascade of market and regulatory responses.  Tenet’s investors fled,72 
and pending merger partners became skittish.73  Tenet’s stock value 
had reached a fifty-two-week high of $52.20 on October 3, 2002.74  By 
November 9, 2002, the price had dropped to $14.90, a seventy-one 
percent decline in value.75 
In response to Weakley’s report, Tenet officials admitted that 
the company received higher-than-average Medicare outlier 
payments but maintained that the payments were legal.76  The 
outlier issue brought the company’s aggressive pricing strategy 
under scrutiny because a key element of the special payment 
formula is the amount that hospitals charge for various services.  
Also, outlier payments tend to correlate with high-reimbursement 
specialty services, such as cardiology, orthopedics, and neurology.  
In addition, Tenet’s market control and ability to negotiate high 
rates with commercial insurers had the side effect of driving up the 
company’s charges across the board, including charges to the 
government.  Higher charges produced higher Medicare outlier 
payments.77 
Weakley’s report and the resulting scrutiny of Medicare outlier 
payments were not Tenet’s only concerns.  The company was 
attracting government and public attention on other issues around 
the same time.  Two physicians in Tenet’s Redding, California, 
facility were suspected of performing medically unnecessary heart 
 
largest American bankruptcies occurred in 2002); see also Kopytoff, supra note 
8, at G1; Note, The Good, the Bad, supra note 8, at 2123 (listing the era’s 
bankruptcy filings). 
 72. See Brown, supra note 8, at R2. 
 73. See Paul Bartels, Hospital Examining Tenet Troubles, NEW ORLEANS 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 13, 2002, at B1 [hereinafter Bartels, Examining] 
(regarding Tenet’s bid to takeover Slidell Memorial Hospital); see also Rhonda 
L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare Says SEC to Look Into Stock Trades, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 19, 2002, at A3 (discussing Slidell deal); see also Paul Bartels, Hospital 
Board’s Chairman Resigns: SMH Sale Rejected by Huge Margin, NEW ORLEANS 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 8, 2003, at B1 (reporting on local voters rejecting the sale 
of a community hospital and the hospital board chairman’s subsequent 
resignation). 
 74. Rhonda L. Rundle & Anna Wilde Mathews, Tenet Reaped Outsize Gains 
From Flaw in Medicare System, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2002, at A1. 
 75. Id.; Karl Stark & Josh Goldstein, Tenet’s Lucrative Medicare Billing 
Seen at 3 Hospitals, PHIL. INQUIRER, Nov. 9, 2002, at C1. 
 76. See Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74 (reporting that Tenet expected to 
receive 23.5% of its Medicare revenue from outlier payments, compared to 
HCA’s expected 5%); Stark & Goldstein, supra note 75.  
 77. Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74, at A1; Carolyn Said, Profiting from 
Health Care: Hospital Chain’s Steep Prices Blamed for Raising Costs for All, 
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2002, at A1. 
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surgeries.78  Around the same time, a Latino advocacy group accused 
Tenet of overcharging uninsured patients.79  By January 2003, the 
government had issued two investigatory subpoenas, one related to 
Medicare outlier payments and another for an earlier fraud 
initiative on “upcoding,” a strategy for boosting Medicare 
reimbursement by selecting higher reimbursement diagnoses on 
patients’ billing forms.80  The government also was looking into 
allegations that management at a Tenet hospital in San Diego, 
California, offered physicians kickbacks for referring patients.81  
Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission was 
investigating high trading volume preceding some Tenet public 
announcements, including statements regarding Medicare outlier 
payments.82  Later, in the post-Enron furor, a United States Senate 
committee opened a probe of the company’s corporate governance 
practices, suggesting that the company may be “ethically and 
 
 78. Rundle, supra note 73; Ronald D. White, Pressure on Tenet Chief to 
Resign, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at C1; see Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet 
Healthcare Agrees to Pay $54 Million to Settle U.S. Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 
2003, at B2 (discussing Tenet’s agreement to settle government allegations of 
unnecessary procedures and surgeries at Redding Medical Center). 
 79. Andrew Pollack & Reed Abelson, Chief Faces Questions Again After 
Restoring Tenet Once, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at C2; see also Rhonda L. 
Rundle, Tenet Healthcare Faces Lawsuits by Latinos Alleging Overcharging, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2002, at B6; Said, supra note 77, at A1; Carolyn Said, 
Tenet Plans to Ease Up on Uninsured Patients; Hospitals to Cut Prices, Stop 
Suing Jobless, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 2003, at A1 (noting Tenet’s voluntary 
policy change regarding billing uninsured patients). 
 80. Katherine Vogt, Tenet Shaking Up Board, Management, AM. MED. 
NEWS, Apr. 28, 2003 (discussing upcoding allegations), available at http:// 
www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_03/bisc0428.htm; see also Ronald D. 
White, Tenet Profit Jumps, but Forecast Dims; Hospital Chain Cuts Fiscal 2003 
Earnings Outlook as it Reduces the Amount it Charges Medicare, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 14, 2003, at C1 (discussing same upcoding allegations). 
 81. Andrew Pollack, Tenet to Sell or Shut Hospitals and Cut Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at C3 (regarding San Diego’s Alvarado Hospital Medical 
Center); Rhonda L. Rundle, CEO at Tenet Hospital Faces Charges on Payments 
to Doctors, WALL. ST. J., June 9, 2003, at B2 (reporting that federal prosecutors 
charged the Alvarado CEO with making illegal payments to induce physicians 
to refer patients); Tenet Administrator Surrenders to Judge Amid Federal 
Probe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at B6 (reporting that an associate 
administrator of Alvarado, accused of receiving personal payments for 
arranging relocation agreements, surrendered to federal arrest warrant). 
 82. See Rundle, supra note 73 (reporting that the SEC opened an “informal 
file” on Tenet); see also Press Release, Tenet Shareholder Committee, LLC, 
Tenet Shareholder Committee Asks Government to Investigate New Claims of 
Securities Law Violations (Jan. 6, 2003) (announcing Tenet shareholders’ 
request that SEC initiate formal investigation), at http:// 
www.tenetshareholdercommittee.org/Press5.htm. 
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morally bankrupt” and “among the worst corporate wrongdoers.”83 
With respect to outlier payments, at least, Wall Street and other 
observers failed to appreciate the inevitable and not entirely 
unintended or objectionable correlation between Tenet’s competitive 
strategies and the lucrative outlier revenue stream under the 
Medicare program.  Congress created a limited pool of Medicare 
payments to reimburse health care providers for serving patients 
who are extraordinarily costly to treat.  Tenet did not shy away from 
the expensive cases but, rather, welcomed them as a part of its 
business strategy.  Tenet’s aggressive pricing, focus on high-
reimbursement services, and investment in new technology 
attracted the high-cost cases and allowed its hospitals to secure a 
significant share of the special outlier payments.  In particular, 
Tenet astutely focused on delivering complex services in high 
demand by aging health care consumers.  The high demand for, and 
complexity of, these services allowed Tenet to increase its charges to 
commercial and private payors.  As it turned out, Tenet’s ability to 
deliver specialized services and command high prices also tended to 
generate Medicare outlier payments. 
 But after Enron and other episodes, Tenet’s high earnings 
attracted scrutiny.  Drawing on the widely reported scandals as 
examples, the public began to view strong earnings as an indication 
not of legitimate business prowess, but possible wrongdoing and 
questionable operations.  Wall Street combed financial reports for an 
indication that a company’s profits could be explained by “cheating” 
rather than “fair” competition.84  The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants’ auditing standards expressly identify “[r]apid 
growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other 
companies in the same industry” as a fraud risk factor.85  The public 
began to doubt the market’s ability to self-regulate desirable 
corporate conduct,86 and regulators responded. In July 2002, 
 
 83. Rhonda L. Rundle, Senate Panel is Investigating Tenet, WALL. ST. J., 
Sept. 8, 2003, at B10 (quoting the contents of four-page letter sent to Trevor 
Fetter, Tenet’s acting CEO). 
 84. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 8, at 49. 
 85. See Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, Appendix to SAS No. 99, 
Fraud Risk Factors, available at http://www.aicpa.org/antifraud/risk/38.htm; see 
also Jonathan Weil, Did Ernst Miss Key Fraud Risks at HealthSouth? WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 10, 2003, at C1 (discussing the AICPA standards in context of Ernst & 
Young’s auditing work for HealthSouth Corp.’s “massive accounting fraud”). 
 86. See, e.g., PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT 
ENRON 150 (2002) (suggesting that some view Enron’s collapse as “the market’s 
way of enforcing its standards for honesty,” while “[o]ther companies, fearing 
the wrath of the market, were immediately forced to become more forthcoming 
without any deliberative action from the accounting profession or the 
government,” and concluding that “[t]he true lesson of Enron is that one who 
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Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act87 specifically to address to 
the widely reported incidents of corporate malfeasance.88  
Scrambling to dispel the increasingly negative public attention, 
companies like Tenet revised and abandoned various business plans 
and strategies that generated unusually high, and now 
presumptively illegitimate, earnings. 
 
lives by the market can also die by the market”); see also FRANK PARTNOY, 
INFECTIOUS GREED 2 (2003) (arguing that “conventional wisdom” that “markets 
would remain under control, that the few bad apples would be punished” is 
wrong); Arthur Levitt, Jr. & Richard C. Breeden, Our Ethical Erosion, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A16 (former SEC chairmen discussing the importance of 
investors’ trust and realizing that, since Enron, that trust has been abused and 
taken for granted).  But see Susan Lee, The Dismal Science: Enron’s Success 
Story, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2001, at A11 (concluding that “no matter how one 
views the purposes or operations of a competitive market, the history of Enron 
proves that the market works pretty much as expected.  And thus the story of 
Enron is, so far, a success story.”). 
 87. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections 
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).  A proprietary health care company, 
HealthSouth Corp., was the first company to be sanctioned by the SEC under 
the new Sarbanes-Oxley corporate disclosure and certification requirements.  
See Kate Kelly, Sealed, Delivered but Not Yet Signed by CEOs, WALL ST. J., July 
25, 2003, at C1; see also Patti Bond, A Fraud Squad Dream: HealthSouth Case 
to Test New Law, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 11, 2003, at Q1. 
 88. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: 
An Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 357, 358 (2003) (noting that “Congress reacted to the Enron fiasco by 
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and directing the [SEC] to engage in 
rulemaking to address the perceived problems”); Kathryn Stewart Lehman, 
Executive Compensation Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 81 N.C. L. 
REV. 2115, 2115-18 (2002) (describing various corporate scandals and noting 
that “[w]ith this legislation [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] Congress intended to calm 
a volatile market, inspire investor confidence, and stop the flood of corporate 
scandals”); Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 417, 440 (2003) (indicating that “Congress responded to Enron and similar 
scandals by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and identifying the Act’s attempts 
to address some suboptimal, behavioral tendencies); Lawrence M. Solan, 
Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2211 
(2003) (indicating that Sarbanes-Oxley was “enacted in response to the 
financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other major corporations”); Harvey 
L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A18 
(outlining the SEC’s regulatory response); Michael Schroeder, Levitt Calls for 
New Laws on Accounting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A4 (quoting former 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt calling Enron “a wake-up call,” and “the smoking 
gun [that] has exploded”); see also Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Agency, Interrupted, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at A11 (suggesting that the SEC’s recent hands-on 
approach to regulating markets, rather than trusting efficient market 
hypothesis is “telling us something.  They’re letting us know the pressures and 
expectations of society are finally getting to them.”). 
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C. Tenet’s Fall 
As Tenet’s earnings and practices came under scrutiny, Wall 
Street’s darling became Wall Street’s pariah.  Tenet’s “robust” and 
“strong” pricing trends were recharacterized as “cowboy medicine,”89 
“Wall Street medicine,”90 “turbocharging,”91 “too aggressive,”92 and 
“unusually hearty profits.”93  At first, Tenet staunchly maintained 
that it had done nothing illegal under the Medicare program.94  Even 
if Tenet’s strategy was not technically illegal, the investing public 
remained uneasy.  One commentator suggested: “The firm picked its 
markets, concentrated on lucrative surgeries, and milked Medicare 
for extra ‘outlier’ payments.  That may meet the law, but the results 
victimize both patients and taxpayers.”95  Analysts and observers 
renewed questions about the basic compatibility of profit-orientation 
and health care delivery.96  Praise for Tenet’s turn-around successes 
and unprecedented growth was replaced by doubts about the 
company’s integrity and fairness.97  Tenet’s own shareholders 
 
 89. Editorial, Time to Rein In “Cowboy Medicine,” S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 
2002, at A30 [hereinafter Cowboy Medicine] (describing high-pressure tactics at 
Tenet’s Redding hospital). 
 90. See Katherine Vogt, Suit Claims Unnecessary Surgeries at Tenet, AM. 
MED. NEWS, May 19, 2003 (quoting opposing counsel’s comment: “We believe 
that the Tenet health system practices what we call ‘Wall Street Medicine;’ 
They practice bottom-line medicine to drive their stock prices up.”), available at 
http://ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_03/bisc0519.htm. 
 91. See Said, supra note 77 (quoting a Service Employees International 
Union representative). 
 92. See Bartels, Examining, supra note 73 (quoting the Slidell Memorial 
Hospital board’s consultant regarding Tenet’s pursuit of outlier payments); see 
also Pollack & Abelson, supra note 79, at C2 (noting that government “inquiries 
are raising concerns about whether Tenet was too aggressive in raising prices”). 
 93. See Said, supra note 79 (noting a UCLA bankruptcy law professor’s 
assessment that aggressive collection practices may have been one of the 
reasons for Tenet’s success). 
 94. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, An Open Letter to 
Shareholders of Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Nov. 18, 2002) available at 
http://www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/PressCenter/PressReleases/An+Open
+Letter+to+Shareholders+of+Tenet+Healthcare+Corporation.htm. 
 95. Cowboy Medicine, supra note 89. 
 96. See Pollack & Abelson, supra note 79 (noting that Tenet’s troubles raise 
questions about “whether its quest for profits threatens its quality of care”); 
Rundle & Mathews, supra note 77 (quoting a Tenet investment firm 
representative’s query “whether Tenet managers ‘prefer revenue to quality of 
care’”); Said, supra note 7 (noting that “Tenet’s approach to pricing is not 
necessarily illegal” but that “a range of observers, including ordinarily profit-
focused Wall Street analysts, have begun to question the ethics behind charging 
so much for health care”); Vogt, supra note 90. 
 97. See, e.g., Stark & Goldstein, supra note 75 (quoting a health care 
analyst’s assessment that Tenet “has left itself open to boundless questions of 
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prepared a report estimating the company’s potential fraud liability 
for Medicare outlier abuses at $6 billion.98 
Attempting to restore investor confidence and avoid other 
reputational sanctions, Tenet took various steps.  Specifically, the 
company dismantled its management structure, revised its pricing 
policy, and voluntarily reduced the amount of Medicare 
reimbursement it claimed by voluntarily modifying key features of 
the outlier payment formula long before regulators proposed similar 
changes.99  Less than two weeks after Weakley issued his report, 
Tenet announced the departure of two high-level executives just 
below chairman and chief executive officer Jeffery C. Barbakow.100  
One was Thomas B. Mackey, the chief operating officer credited 
with developing the company’s aggressive pricing strategy.101  A 
month before the government launched a nationwide inquiry into 
Medicare outlier payments across all hospitals, Tenet initiated a 
self-audit of its pricing policy and outlier payments.102  The self-audit 
revealed substantial and dramatically increased outlier payments in 
recent years.  Barbakow expressed surprise at the findings and 
asserted that he had never focused on outlier payments until 
 
integrity”); see also Cowboy Medicine, supra note 89 (urging that “there must be 
sharp oversight of the public dime and the common good”); Pollack & Abelson, 
supra note 79 (discussing various opinions about Tenet CEO Barbakow’s 
integrity); Said, supra note 77 (quoting a nonprofit research group 
representative as saying that “Tenet is driving up the cost of health care in 
California for everyone”). 
 98. Glenn Singer, Tenet Healthcare Could Face $6 Billion in Liability for 
Medicare, Panel Says, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 8, 2003, at D1 (reporting the 
shareholder committee’s findings that Tenet increased outlier charges “in a 
manner that lacks any connection to increases in the cost of its services” and 
could be liable for treble damages and civil fines under the False Claims Act). 
 99. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corp., Tenet Volunteers to Adopt New 
Outlier Policy (Jan 6. 2003) at http://www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/ 
PressCenter/PressReleases/Tenet+Volunteers+to+Adopt+New+Outlier+Policy.h
tm. 
 100. See Rhonda L. Rundle & Anna Wilde Mathews, Tenet to Restructure 
Amid Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2002, at A3 (discussing the departures of 
Chief Corporate Officer David L. Dennis and Chief Operating Officer Thomas B. 
Mackey). 
 101. See Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74, at A1 (stating that “Mr. Mackey 
developed a policy to raise so-called chargemaster prices, a kind of health-care 
equivalent of the sticker price at car lots”). 
 102. See Rundle & Mathews, supra note 100, at A3 (reporting that a Tenet 
“internal study found that sharp rises in certain prices at its hospitals . . . have 
led to increasingly large collections from Medicare of so-called outlier 
payments”); see infra note 187 and accompanying text (describing CMS program 
memoranda issued to local Medicare contractors in late 2002 and early 2003). 
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Weakley began asking questions.103  Barbakow’s “Ken Lay-esque”104 
response of denying awareness of a scheme purportedly devised by 
lower management did little to calm investors.105  Before long, 
Barbakow was ousted from his posts, first as board chairman,106 and 
eventually as CEO.107 
 Tenet made other changes aimed at restoring legitimacy and 
improving accountability.  For example, Tenet placed a physician in 
charge of its California division,108 a geographical region drawing a 
considerable share of the negative attention.  The company also 
replaced several board members and appointed a former auditor to 
the board.109  Trevor Fetter, the interim CEO who succeeded 
Barbakow, was made permanent CEO.110  Later, Tenet’s chief in-
house legal counsel and chief corporate officer, Christi R. Sulzbach, 
resigned under pressure and concerns regarding her ability to 
resolve the various government investigations and other problems.111  
Tenet replaced Sulzbach with Peter Urbanowicz, outgoing deputy 
general counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
 
 103. Rundle & Mathews, supra note 74, at A1 (reporting that Barbakow said 
he “never focused on the financial impact of the outlier payments until 
sometime in the week of Oct. 14 when Mr. Weakley . . . called”). 
 104. See Mitchell Pacelle & Rebecca Smith, Enron’s Lay Resigns as 
Chairman, CEO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2002, at A3 (stating that Lay “has 
indicated he wasn’t fully aware of the details of the controversial partnerships 
whose disclosure led to major financial losses”). 
 105. See White, supra note 78 (noting that Barbakow “said he was unaware 
of the extent of Tenet’s use of the Medicare billing program,” which led 
investors, analysts, and observers to ask: “If Barbakow didn’t know, why didn’t 
he?  And if he did know, why didn’t he address it?”). 
 106. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet’s CEO Plans to Leave Board, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 8, 2003, at A2; see also Debora Vrana, Group Urges Tenet to Split Top 2 
Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at C2 (reporting on the American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees Pension Plan’s proposal and 
Barbakow’s offer to resign from board in the fall of 2002, when issues surfaced). 
 107. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet CEO Quits After Board Meets, WALL ST. 
J., May 28, 2003, at A3 (reporting Barbakow’s early departure, planned for July 
2003, and replacement by Trevor Fetter, brought in as president in November 
2002). 
 108. See James F. Peltz, Doctor to Head Tenet California Operations, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at C3 (regarding the promotion of Dr. Stephen L. 
Newman to the newly created post of chief executive of Tenet California). 
 109. See Ronald D. White, Tenet Adds Former Deloitte CEO to Board, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at C2 (regarding the board appointment of Edward A. 
Kangas, former chief executive of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu); Vogt, supra note 
90, (reporting replacing one-third of board and appointment of new chair). 
 110. See Rhonda L. Rundle & Joann S. Lublin, Tenet Names Fetter 
Permanent CEO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2003, at A6. 
 111. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare’s Sulzbach Resigns Amid Critics’ 
Pressure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2003, at B6. 
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the agency that oversees the Medicare program.112  Still re-tooling, 
Tenet specifically recruited replacement executives from outside the 
health care industry, including energy-industry veteran Robert S. 
Shapard, as chief financial officer.113 
Tenet also adopted a new pricing philosophy that de-
emphasized list charges,114 discounted charges to uninsured and 
under-insured patients, and relaxed debt collection efforts.115  Those 
changes facilitated settlement of various unfair pricing lawsuits.116  
In announcing the new policies, Tenet expressed a commitment to 
“fair treatment of uninsured patients,”117 echoing the public’s new 
focus on corporate fairness over profitability.  Tenet’s voluntary 
pricing and other policy changes preceded agency regulations on 
charges to uninsured patients.118 
 
 112. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare Taps HHS Lawyer as Top Counsel, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2003, at B4. 
 113. See Who’s News: Tenet Selects Utility Executive As Its Chief Financial 
Officer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at B10 (noting that, in addition to “utility 
executives, Tenet considered candidates at banks, insurers and information-
services giants.  Among the targeted high-tech providers were ones that provide 
a lot of services to the federal government.”). 
 114. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Unveils Pricing Approach, Slashes 
Estimates, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2002, at A2 (describing Tenet’s “restrained 
pricing philosophy” that deemphasized “‘gross charges,’ which rarely bear any 
resemblance to what hospitals are actually paid for the services they provide”); 
Ronald D. White & Don Lee, Tenet Cuts Earnings Forecast for 2 Years, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at C1 (reporting Tenet’s new pricing strategy “that includes 
discounts for uninsured patients” and is “mov[ing] away from reimbursements 
based on gross retail charges set by hospitals in favor of fixed daily fees”). 
 115. See Said, supra note 79 (reporting on Tenet’s new policy to discount 
prices to the uninsured and to restrain collection practices, including placing 
liens on patients’ homes). 
 116. See Rundle, supra note 79 (discussing allegations by Consejo de Latinos 
Unidos); Said, supra note 79 (reporting on the settlement of ten lawsuits 
brought by uninsured Latino patients in Los Angeles). 
 117. Said, supra note 79. 
 118. The practice of hospitals billing full charges to uninsured patients was 
a nationwide problem.  In a letter to HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson, 
American Hospital Association members identified their understanding that 
HHS regulations prohibit offering discounts to uninsured patients and require 
active collection practices.  Thompson responded that “[n]othing in the Medicare 
program rules or regulations prohibit such discounts.”  News Release, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Text of Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of 
Health & Human Services, to Richard J. Davidson, President, American 
Hospital Association (Feb. 19, 2004), at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/ 
2004pres/20040219.html.  The OIG also issued guidance to hospitals regarding 
discounts to uninsured and underinsured patients, asserting that the agency 
“fully supports hospitals’ efforts in this area.”  DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS OFFERED TO PATIENTS 
WHO CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY THEIR HOSPITAL BILLS 1 (2004) [hereinafter HHS, 
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Regarding Medicare outlier payments, Tenet took an 
unprecedented step by voluntarily and anticipatorily modifying 
federal Medicare regulations.  Specifically, Tenet changed certain 
key features of the formula for calculating outlier adjustments on its 
own records several months before the government issued final 
regulations implementing similar amendments.119  Company officials 
announced the damages, publicly declaring a desire to align with the 
government’s new outlier initiative:  
We want to be part of CMS’[s] [Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services] solution to the outlier issue and we support 
across-the-board modifications.  To that end, we are willing to 
step forward and adopt what we anticipate may become 
central components of CMS’[s] new outlier rule as though the 
agency had put it into effect Jan. 1, 2003.120   
 Tenet faced an estimated $700 million reduction in Medicare 
payments as a result of the voluntary changes.121  At first, the 
announcement had minimal impact on Tenet’s already gutted share 
value,122 but three months into the voluntary outlier policy, Tenet 
reported quarterly losses of $55 million, or twelve cents per share.123 
 
HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/ 
alertsandbulletins/2004/FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf.  See generally Lucette 
Lagnado, HHS Chief Scolds Hospitals for their Treatment of Uninsured, WALL. 
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2004, at A2 (quoting Legal Aid Society attorney Elisabeth 
Benjamin: “This finally puts to rest the hospital’s tired and inaccurate 
argument that the government made them charge uninsured and underinsured 
people these crazy inflated prices.”). 
 119. See Editorial, Tenet’s Shareholder Ills, supra note 2 (describing Tenet’s 
self-policing modifications); see also Medicare Program; Change in Methodology 
for Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) 
Under Acute Care Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective 
Payment Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494 (June 9, 2003) (to be codified 
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (revising various aspects of the Medicare outlier payment 
formula). 
 120. Press Release, supra note 99 (quoting Tenet President Trevor Fetter); 
see infra notes 141-94 and accompanying text (describing Medicare outlier 
payments and loopholes).  In particular, Tenet vowed to rely on up-to-date cost 
and charge data and abandon use of the statewide average RCC in submitting 
Medicare outlier claims.  See Andy Pasztor, Tenet Voluntarily Cuts Amount of 
Hospital Medicare Payments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2003, at B7 (describing 
Tenet’s plans to “halt[] all outlier payments based on ‘statewide average’ 
calculations” and to “rely on the latest available cost data to determine the level 
of reimbursement sought from Medicare”). 
 121. See Pasztor, supra note 12; Ronald D. White, Tenet to Alter Billing, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at C1 (noting that $700 million was “the worst-case 
scenario” and CMS Administrator Scully’s estimate that Tenet may have 
received $500 million in outlier overpayments). 
 122. See Pasztor, supra note 120, at B7 (noting that “[i]nvestors took the 
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As financial prospects worsened, Tenet sought to further reduce 
costs by selling assets, including fourteen of its 114 hospitals, firing 
non-patient care staff, and restricting corporate travel expenses.124  
At the beginning of 2004, Tenet remained on financially shaky 
ground, evidenced by continued restructuring, asset divestiture, and 
revised earnings reports.125  Management reorganization and 
government investigations continued as well.126  By the end of 2004, 
Tenet expected to report a loss, including write-downs on the 
estimated current value of its hospitals and goodwill.127 The 
company also reported declining patient volumes due to increased 
competition from outpatient surgery centers and declining physician 
referrals.128  The announcement sent Tenet shares down 8.1% to 
$11.07 by the year’s end.129  
 
announcement in stride, with Tenet shares falling only 10 cents, to $16.68”). 
 123. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Posts Loss; Outlier Payments from U.S. 
Plunge, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2003, at B6 (indicating the loss was due to a 
reduction in outlier payments as well as asset write-downs and “soaring 
medical malpractice expenses”); see also Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare, 
Hurt by Charges, Swings to Loss, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2003, at B4 (describing 
Tenet’s plummeting outlier revenues). 
 124. See, e.g., Stephanie Patrick, Tenet Healthcare Predicting Local Layoffs, 
DALLAS BUS. J., Mar. 28, 2003, (noting the layoffs “as the health care giant 
attempts to eliminate $100 million in expenses amid federal investigations into 
its business practices”); Pollack, supra note 81, at C3; Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet 
Healthcare to Cut Expenses, Revamp Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2003, at 
B3; Tenet to Sell Twelve Oaks Medical Center, HOUSTON BUS. J., Mar. 19, 2003, 
(noting the sale as part of Tenet’s strategy “to reduce operating expenses and 
sharpen its strategic focus”). 
 125. Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Remains on Tenuous Ground, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 27, 2004, at C3 (summarizing an analyst’s assessment that “‘a return to 
normalcy’ at Tenet is ‘quite remote’”); Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare to 
Sell Hospitals and Take Charge of $1.4 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2004, at 
A3 (reporting Tenet’s plans to sell twenty-seven hospitals, including nineteen in 
its largest markets). 
 126. See, e.g., Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Healthcare May Relocate Corporate 
Office, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2004, at B5 (quoting Tenet President Trevor 
Fetter’s memo to employees: “it’s clear to everyone that the Santa Barbara 
headquarters location was originally created for the personal convenience of the 
top executives . . . .”); Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet is Target of New Round of 
Inquiries, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2004, at A9 (summarizing an analyst’s 
suggestion that the new inquiries could be “‘isolated incidents,’ but ‘you never 
know when one of these could mushroom into something bigger’”). 
 127. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet Warns of Slow Recovery, Says it May Post 
Loss Next Year, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2004, at A6. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (discussing various challenges to Tenet’s slow financial recovery, 
including ongoing government investigations). 
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IV. MEDICARE PAYMENT METHODOLOGY 
To appreciate how the public misperceived the risks posed by 
Tenet’s conduct, it is necessary to understand some basics about the 
Medicare payment system.  The outlier adjustment was a well-
known loophole that regulators had previously reviewed and 
adjusted but elected to leave open.  Even assuming Tenet developed 
a business plan specifically to take advantage of that loophole, it is 
not clear that the company did anything wrong.  But in the face of 
Enron and other highly salient examples of corporate fraud and 
wrongdoing, public perceptions of corporate responsibility and 
fairness changed, prompting changes in regulatory priorities.  For 
the health care industry, the government’s response to public 
pressure produced “bad policies” that were poorly considered and 
unnecessarily disruptive to the intricate Medicare payment 
structure and incentives. 
When the Medicare program was enacted in 1965, the 
government reimbursed hospitals on a cost basis for all expenses 
incurred in treating Medicare patients.  Hospitals were paid a per 
diem, determined retrospectively from the hospitals’ actual total 
Medicare allowable costs.130  The obvious incentive under a payment 
system like that is to spend as much as possible and order as many 
services as possible because the greater the hospital’s actual 
expenditures, the greater the hospital’s Medicare reimbursement.131  
Not surprisingly, medical costs soared after Medicare 
implementation as both the number of people insured and hospital 
spending increased.132 
 
 130. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes 
Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 
ALA. L. REV. 239, 250 (1999) (“Over the past three decades, Medicare has 
become much more sophisticated in paying for health care goods and services—
developing its own per case, per diem, and per service payment systems.”). 
 131. See Randall A. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical 
Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965, 970 (1981) (noting that 
the “critical incentive” under cost-based reimbursement “is that an institution is 
typically paid more for raising its costs and less if it holds down its costs”);  Jost 
& Davies, supra note 130, at 251 (observing that cost-based, or fee-for-service, 
payment “creates incentives for providers to (1) maximize the volume of 
profitable goods and services for which they bill and (2) maximize profit per 
service by billing for the highest payment rate available for a service, while at 
the same time minimizing the amount expended in providing the service”). 
 132. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE?:  HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND 
SOCIAL CHOICE 173 (1998) (observing that unintended consequences of Great 
Society Medicare and Medicaid programs were increased health care costs and 
physician incomes).  See generally RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 16-17 (1997) (noting that the “enactment of 
Medicare and Medicaid coincided with the beginning of a spectacular escalation 
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To contain costs and reverse the incentives for over-spending 
and over-utilization, Congress, in 1983, dramatically changed the 
way that hospitals are paid under Medicare.133  Under the new 
inpatient Prospective Payment System (“PPS”), hospitals receive a 
predetermined amount for treating Medicare patients, determined 
from the patients’ diagnosis at the time of discharge.134  Payment is 
based on the diagnosis-related group (“DRG”) to which a patient is 
assigned at discharge.135  A hospital receives the same DRG payment 
regardless of the number of procedures or services provided, 
supplies used, or length of stay for the particular patient.  The PPS 
methodology is intended to promote efficiency by reducing the 
incentive to provide unnecessary services or supplies.136  The 
obvious, and intended, incentive is to spend as little as possible, for 
if the hospital’s actual costs come in under the fixed payment 
amount, it retains the excess. 
Under PPS, reimbursement levels are based on average rates 
across all hospitals, and the particular hospital’s actual costs or 
charges for treating patients are largely irrelevant.137  Therefore, 
little opportunity remains to impact Medicare reimbursement by 
increasing costs or charges.  In a few areas, actual costs do matter 
and may affect a hospital’s reimbursement level.  First, hospitals 
may influence the DRG payment amounts to some degree because 
those rates are derived from participating providers’ actual cost 
reports, which regulators review annually to determine the average 
cost of treating a particular disorder.138  Also, certain adjustments to 
the basic DRG payments—including outliers, graduate medical 
 
in national health care spending” and attributing part of the blame to provider-
dominated, cost-based payment system). 
 133. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-25, at 132 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
219, 351. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., id. (noting that PPS “is intended to improve the medicare [sic] 
program’s ability to act as a prudent purchaser of services” and “[m]ore 
important, it is intended to reform the financial incentives hospitals face, 
promoting efficiency in the provision of services by rewarding cost/effective 
hospital practices”); S. REP. NO. 98-21, at 47 (1983), reprinted in 1983 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 193 (noting that PPS promotes efficiency by allowing 
hospitals to retain payment amounts that exceed actual costs and requiring 
them to absorb costs that exceed standard payment rates); see also Methodist 
Hosp. v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing PPS 
legislative history). 
 137. See Barry R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 13-10, at 121-22 (1995). 
 138. See id. (discussing history of Medicare cost-based reimbursement and 
PPS implementation); ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 132, at 469-70, 484-85 
(noting the same). 
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education, and new technology payments—may be based on actual 
costs.139  Finally, the outlier adjustment that hospitals receive for 
unusually expensive cases is based on actual charges for treating 
the patient.140 
A. Medicare Outlier Payments 
At the time PPS was implemented, Congress left open a tiny, 
retrospective, cost-based “loophole”—the outlier adjustment—to 
cover costs of cases that fall far outside the fixed, average diagnosis-
related payment amounts.  Congress recognized that “there will be 
cases within each [DRG] that will be extraordinarily costly to treat, 
relative to the other cases within the DRG, because of severity of 
illness or complicating conditions, and are not adequately 
compensated for under the DRG payment methodology.”141  The 
concern was that hospitals might avoid treating the “hard” cases—
the sickest and neediest Medicare patients—because they would be 
under-reimbursed for those cases. 
Accordingly, PPS calls for Medicare regulators to set aside a 
limited pool of so-called “outlier” payments to defray the extra costs 
hospitals incur in treating these expensive cases.142  By statute, 
Medicare outlier payments may not be less than five or more than 
six percent of total standard DRG payments that CMS projects it 
will make under PPS for any federal fiscal year (“FFY”).143  CMS 
must reduce total standard DRG payments by the proportion of 
 
 139. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a)(2) (2004) (providing an extra payment for 
outlier cases if the “hospital’s charges for covered services, adjusted to operating 
costs and capital costs by applying cost-to-charge ratios”); id. § 412.88(a)(2) 
(providing for an extra payment under inpatient PPS for discharges involving 
new medical services or technologies and providing one calculation method 
based on actual costs for the new service or technology); id. § 412.105(f) 
(providing an extra payment for hospitals that incur indirect costs for graduate 
medical education programs, based, in part, on actual number of “full-time 
equivalent” residents for a cost reporting period). 
 140. Id.  § 412.84(k)-(m). 
 141. S. REP. NO. 98-21, at 51 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 
191. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (2000).  “Total standard DRG 
payments” means the DRG amounts plus add-on payments for new technology, 
IME, and DSH.  Medicare regulations establish the outlier pool, or target 
annual outlier payments, at 5.1% of standard DRG payments.  See Medicare 
Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and 
Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,982, 50,122 (Aug. 1, 2002) (codified at 
42 C.F.R. pt. 405); Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital 
Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1989 Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,476, 
38,503-04 (Sept. 30, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412, 413, 489). 
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estimated outlier payments to be made during the same FFY.144  In 
other words, outlier payments are budget-neutral and do not detract 
from Medicare funds allocated to cover “typical,” non-outlier cases.  
Therefore, even if Medicare providers collected more than their fair 
share of the limited pool of outlier payments, those payments would 
not endanger coverage for standard DRG cases.  Another feature of 
the fixed pool is non-retroactive adjustment.  The outlier pool is 
based on estimated, not actual payments, meaning that CMS is not 
required to recalculate and adjust outlier payment levels at the end 
of the fiscal year, even if the actual amount paid out to providers at 
the end of the year comes in below five percent or above six 
percent.145 
1. Outlier Payment Methodology 
Initially under PPS, hospitals could receive extra payment for 
two types of cases: “day outliers”—extraordinarily long lengths of 
stay—and “cost outliers”—extraordinarily expensive cases.146  Day 
outlier adjustments were available for cases in which the patient’s 
length of stay exceeded the mean length of stay for the assigned 
DRG by a fixed number of days.147  Cost outlier adjustments were 
available for cases in which the charges for the case, adjusted to 
cost, exceeded a fixed multiple of the applicable DRG, or other fixed 
dollar amount.148  Under the original PPS scheme, day outliers were 
calculated first, with cost outliers as a back-up method for 
reimbursing high-cost cases that did not qualify for an outlier 
payment based on length of stay.149 
Over time, the provision for day outliers was phased out 
because the loophole was too obvious.  Day outlier payments were 
easy to “game” simply by keeping a patient in the hospital past the 
fixed day-outlier cutoff.  The loophole was particularly lucrative 
because the later days of a patient’s stay tend to be cheaper than 
days at the beginning of the admission.  Therefore, the hospital 
 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.80, 412.84 (2004). 
 145. See County of L.A. v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that retrospective review and adjustment of Medicare outlier 
payments are not required by statute and would result in undue administrative 
burdens). 
 146. Id. at 1009. 
 147. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i). 
 148. See id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii). 
 149. Id. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (providing that the Secretary “shall” 
provide an additional payment for day outliers and that providers “may 
request” an additional payment for cost outliers); see S. REP. NO. 98-21, at 51 
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 191; H.R. REP. NO. 98-21, at 135 
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 354. 
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derived a bonus payment from relatively low additional costs.  
Certain government-commissioned studies of health care 
reimbursement revealed that hospitals were being overpaid, and, in 
many cases, profiting from day outlier payments.150  Regulators also 
were concerned that day outlier payments disadvantaged hospitals 
that received a high number of transfer cases.151  Although a transfer 
case may be costly to treat, the transferee hospital might not meet 
the day outlier length of stay threshold because the initial days of 
the admission occurred at a different hospital.152  Accordingly, 
Congress phased out day outliers over a three-year period, 
beginning in 1993.153 
But cost outlier payments remain.  Just as providers could 
increase their day outlier payments by keeping patients in the 
hospital longer, providers can influence their cost outlier payments 
through a different strategy.  However, the loophole is less obvious.  
The complicated formula for calculating the cost outlier adjustment 
includes a hospital’s actual costs and charges for medical 
treatment.154  Therefore, by increasing charges—the “list price”—for 
treatment, hospitals can increase cost outlier payments. 
 
 150. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective 
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1993 Rates, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,618, 23,640 
(June 4, 1992) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413) (summarizing a RAND 
Corporation study showing that hospitals, on average, were being paid twenty-
five percent more than the marginal cost of care for day outlier cases during the 
outlier portion of their stays). 
 151. Id. (discussing the RAND study showing that 38.2% of day outlier cases 
were profitable, after the outlier payment was included, and that later days of 
stay are considerably cheaper than earlier days for both medical and surgical 
DRGs). 
 152. H.R. REP. NO. 103-213, at 749 (1993) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430, 1438 (noting that “the Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission has expressed concern that the Secretary’s outlier policy penalizes 
hospitals that receive a large number of transfer cases”). 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(v) (1994) (providing for a three-year phase-
out by which “the day outlier percentage for fiscal year 1995 shall be [seventy-
five] percent of the day outlier percentage for fiscal year 1994,” fifty percent for 
fiscal year 1996, and twenty-five percent for fiscal year 1997); see H.R. REP. NO. 
103-66, at 509 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 738, 741 (mentioning a 
proposed amendment that would require phase-out of “payments for day outlier 
cases beginning in fiscal year 1995 and ending in fiscal year 1998); H.R.  REP. 
NO. 103-213, at 749 (1993) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430, 
1438.  Day outlier payments were phased out completely for discharges 
occurring after September 30, 1997.  Medicare Program; Changes to the 
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1995 Rates, 
59 Fed. Reg. 45,330, 45,367 (Sept. 1, 1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412). 
 154. See Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient 
Hospital Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,777 (Sept. 1, 1983) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 405, 409, 489).  
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Under the outlier statute, cost outlier payments were based on 
the difference between the hospital’s “adjusted costs” for the case 
and a cost outlier threshold.155 Adjusted costs are derived from a 
ratio of the provider’s covered charges compared to costs (“RCC”).  
The RCC is designed to account for the tendency of costs and 
charges to accelerate at different rates.156  Initially, a single, uniform 
RCC, derived from nationwide cost and charge data, was applied to 
all hospitals.157  During the earlier years of PPS, the Health Care 
Financing Agency (“HCFA”), CMS’s predecessor agency, dismissed 
providers’ objections to the nationwide RCC.158  Providers suggested 
that the nationwide RCC failed to account for regional and other 
differences in costs and charging practices and urged the agency to 
implement regional, provider-specific, or hospital department-
specific RCCs to yield more accurate outlier payments.159  CMS 
consistently declined to amend the formula, citing administrative 
ease and consistency with reliance on nationwide data elsewhere in 
the payment methodology.160  
But eventually, the agency shifted to provider-specific RCCs.  In 
explaining the policy change, HCFA acknowledged that nationwide 
RCCs were having an undesirable distributive effect of transferring 
payment away from struggling hospitals to already profitable, 
efficiently operated hospitals.161  Hospitals with lower costs per case 
under the basic DRG rates have lower RCCs and, thus, stand a 
better chance of exceeding the threshold and generating a greater 
outlier adjustment than hospitals with higher costs per case.  
Accordingly, HCFA amended the outlier regulations to require 
provider-specific RCCs, calculated annually.162  With this shift to 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient 
Hospital Services, 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 265 (Jan. 3, 1984) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 
405, 409, 489). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 264-65. 
 160. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient 
Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,746, 
39,784 (Sept. 1, 1992) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413); Medicare Program; 
Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal 
Year 1989 Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,476, 38,503-04 (Sept. 30, 1988) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 405, 412, 413, 489); Prospective Payments, 49 Fed. Reg. at 265; 
Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient Hospital 
Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,777 (Sept. 1, 1983) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 
405, 409, 489). 
 161. See Changes, 53 Fed. Reg. at 38,507 (explaining the effects of 
nationwide RCCs). 
 162. See id. at 38,503 (implementing provider-specific RCCs). 
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provider-specific RCCs, HCFA planted the seeds for the Medicare 
outlier payment “abuses” that drew scrutiny of Tenet and other 
hospitals. 
Calculating outlier payments using a provider’s actual costs and 
charges retains an element of retrospective, cost-based 
reimbursement in an otherwise prospective, fixed-payment system.  
PPS was intended to eliminate inefficiencies and incentives to 
overcharge and over-treat by reducing reliance on providers’ actual 
costs and charges.  But the cost outlier adjustment remains as a tiny 
loophole inviting charge inflation. 
2. Outlier Loophole 
Almost from the beginning of PPS implementation, Medicare 
authorities were aware of the potential for hospitals to increase cost 
outlier payments by increasing charges.  But year after year, they 
dismissed concerns and left the outlier loophole in place.  The 
agency believed that the incentive to inflate charges would be 
checked by other aspects of the Medicare payment system, state 
regulation, or private insurance competition.163 
The most common way for a hospital to increase the level of 
Medicare outlier payments is to increase the list prices for medical 
services more rapidly than the hospital’s actual costs are increasing.  
The amount that a hospital receives for an outlier case is a 
percentage of the amount by which the provider’s adjusted costs for 
the case exceed the outlier threshold.164  “Adjusted costs” are 
 
 163. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (quoting regulatory 
preamble). 
 164. The cost outlier threshold in the original PPS implementing regulation 
was $12,000.  Hospitals received sixty percent of the difference as the outlier 
adjustment.  Prospective Payments, 48 Fed. Reg. at 39,776-77.  For FFY 2004, 
the threshold was $50,645.  Medicare Program; Change in Methodology for 
Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) 
Under Acute Care Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective 
Payment Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494 (June 9, 2003) (to be codified 
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (revising various aspects of the Medicare outlier payment 
formula).  Under current regulations, hospitals receive eighty percent of the 
amount by which adjusted costs exceed the outlier threshold.  42 C.F.R. § 
412.84(k) (2004).  For a detailed description and example of the Medicare 
outlier payment formula, which includes separate calculations for capital and 
operating costs, see Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,495.  CMS has 
been increasing the outlier threshold rapidly in recent years in an attempt to 
maintain the percentage of outlier payments within the statutorily required 
five-to-six percent of standard DRG payments.  See supra notes 143-45 and 
accompanying text (discussing outlier pool).  The higher the threshold the fewer 
the cases that qualify for an outlier adjustment.  In FFY 1998, the outlier 
threshold was $11,500.  Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,496.  By 
FFY 2001, the threshold had increased to $17,550.  Id.  The FFY 2002 threshold 
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calculated based on the provider-specific RCC.165  The “costs” that 
are adjusted are the current year’s costs, as reported on the 
provider’s Medicare cost report for the year for which 
reimbursement is sought.  But the cost and charge data used to 
calculate the provider-specific RCC may be from an earlier year’s 
cost report.166  That anomaly occurs because regulations require the 
RCC to be calculated using a “final” cost report.  Typically, CMS 
takes several years to finalize a hospital’s cost report. 
After a provider files its annual cost report, private contractors, 
or fiscal intermediaries (“FIs”), audit and finalize the reports.167  
Overburdened FIs may be two or more years behind in completing 
audits and making final adjustments to providers’ cost reports.168  In 
addition, even after a cost report is finalized, the FI may delay 
additional months before implementing the adjusted RCC for a 
particular provider.  In the meanwhile, the provider’s out-of-date 
RCC, based on an earlier, and typically lower, charge structure, 
continues to be used.  By increasing charges in the current year, 
while the RCC against which the charges are compared remains 
constant, a hospital may generate larger outlier payments for 
qualifying cases and cause more cases to qualify for outlier 
adjustments than if the RCC were based on the current year’s 
 
was $21,025, representing a twenty-four percent increase.  Id.  The FFY 2003 
increase to $33,560 represents approximately a sixty percent increase in one 
year.  Id. 
 165. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (summarizing outlier 
payment formula). 
 166. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Proposed Change in Methodology for 
Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) 
Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 10,420, 10,423 (Mar. 5, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (discussing lag-
time in calculating the provider-specific RCC). 
 167. CMS delegates responsibility for administering the Medicare program 
and determining reimbursement amounts at the local level to private 
contractors.  Local contractors for Medicare Part A, which includes inpatient 
hospitalization, are known as fiscal intermediaries, or FIs.  Local contractors for 
Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient services, are known as carriers. 
 168. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective 
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1994 Rates, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,270, 46,347 
(Sept. 1, 1993) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413) (“Because we use the latest 
available cost-to-charge ratios (which may be as much as 2 years old) to convert 
billed charges to costs for purposes of estimating cost outlier payments, we may 
be overestimating outlier payments in setting the thresholds.”); Press Release, 
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Takes Steps to Crack Down on 
Inappropriate Hospital Outlier Claims (Feb. 28, 2003) (noting that “the longer 
the lag between the historical data and the current charges—currently two 
years—the less accurate the estimate will be”), at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
media/press/release.asp?counted=715. 
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charges.169  In CMS’s recent outlier initiative, the agency specifically 
identified the “lag-time” in updating provider-specific RCCs as 
creating an opportunity for providers to “game” the system by 
increasing charges more rapidly than costs.170 
Another way that providers can increase outlier payments is by 
taking advantage of a regulation that requires FIs to use a 
statewide average RCC instead of the provider-specific RCC under 
certain circumstances.  If the provider-specific RCC is more than 
three standard deviations, plus or minus, from the mean RCC for all 
hospitals, fiscal intermediaries are required to revert to a statewide 
average RCC.171  If the statewide RCC is more favorable, in terms of 
generating outlier payments, than the provider-specific RCC, a 
provider may inflate charges to throw its own RCC below the three 
 
 169. See Proposed Change, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,423 (noting that “[i]f the rate-
of-charge increases . . . exceeds the rate of the hospital’s cost increases during 
that time, the hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio [RCC] based on its [earlier] cost 
report will be too high, and applying it to current charges will overestimate the 
hospital’s costs per case during [the current year]”). 
 170. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM 
INTERMEDIARIES, NOTICE REGARDING COST-TO-CHARGE RATIOS AND INPATIENT 
OUTLIER PAYMENTS, TRANSMITTAL NO. A-02-122 (2002) [hereinafter CMS, 
NOTICE], available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A02122.pdf 
(“Analysis of hospital charges since 1999 reveals that some hospitals’ charges 
have grown at a much higher rate than the national average.  Although these 
extraordinary increases will eventually result in lower CCRs [cost-to-charge 
ratios, i.e., ratio of cost-to-charges, or RCCs], the lag [time] between when 
charges are increased and the availability of cost reports results in higher 
outlier payments than is the case if the CCRs were updated more timely. . . .  
The CMS believes that some hospitals may be attempting to ‘game’ the current 
payment systems for the purposes of maximizing payment.”); see also Proposed 
Change, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,424 (noting that “a hospital has the ability to 
increase its outlier payments during this lag time through dramatic charge 
increases”); Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS 
Issues Final Rule for Outlier Payments to Hospitals (June 5, 2003) (quoting 
CMS Administrator Thomas Scully: “Last year, CMS discovered that a small 
number of hospitals—a few hundred—had been manipulating the outlier 
formula by aggressively increasing their charges compared to their costs.”), at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A02122.pdf. 
 171. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(h) (2004) (“[S]tatewide cost-to-charge ratios are used 
in those instances in which a hospital’s operating or capital cost-to-charge ratios 
fall outside reasonable parameters.  CMS sets forth [these] parameters and the 
statewide cost-to-charge ratios in each year’s annual notice of prospective 
payment rates . . . .”); see Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,496 
(describing three standard deviations to the rule); Medicare Program; Changes 
to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1989 
Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,476, 38,503 (Sept. 30, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 
405, 412, 413, 489) (implementing use of statewide RCCs when hospital-specific 
RCCs fall outside reasonable parameters). 
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standard deviations range.172  Tenet was accused of “gaming” the 
outlier adjustment through both the RCC lag-time and statewide 
average RCC methods.173 
CMS has long been aware of the outlier loophole and potential 
for charge inflation.  As early as 1989, in implementing the switch 
from the single, nationwide RCC to provider-specific RCCs, 
regulators identified and discussed at some length the potential for 
charge inflation as a means of increasing outlier payments.174  But 
they elected not to address the problem, believing that market or 
other factors would mitigate any improper incentives.175  The agency 
concluded: “[T]his incentive to manipulate charges is not new; in 
fact, any measure of cost (including length of stay) that is based on 
an indicator that is within the control of the provider provides an 
incentive to manipulate that indicator.”176  HCFA left the outlier 
 
 172. See Proposed Change, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,423 (explaining the 
vulnerability of the standard deviation rule) 
 173. See, e.g., Pasztor, supra note 120, at B7 (describing Tenet’s plans to 
“halt[] all outlier payments based on ‘statewide average’ calculations” and “rely 
on the latest available cost data to determine the level of reimbursement sought 
from Medicare”). 
 174. See, e.g., Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment 
Systems, 53 Fed. Reg. at 38,509. 
 175. The preamble to the formal rulemaking noted: 
Since both the cost-to-charge ratio (whether national or hospital-
specific) and the threshold are constant for the payment period, the 
payment received by the hospital can be increased by increasing 
charges.  In addition, hospitals can conceivably change their charge 
structures, just as is the case at present, to maximize their outlier 
payments. 
Although concern over this type of incentive is appropriate, we 
believe that there are several factors that will mitigate its effects.  
First, increases in a hospital’s overall charges relative to costs will be 
reflected in the cost-to-charge ratio assigned to the hospital in the 
future.  This is one of the strong arguments for the use of the hospital-
specific cost-to-charge ratios.  Second, many hospitals are restricted in 
their ability to arbitrarily increase their charges by the fact that they 
must deal with other third-party payers, some of which base their 
payments on charges.  Also, several States place restrictions on 
hospital charge increases.  Third, a general acceleration in hospital 
charge increases can be incorporated into the setting of thresholds in 
future years, which would limit the potential benefit to hospitals. 
Fourth, outlier payments comprise a small percent of total 
hospital payments under the prospective payment system, diluting 
the incentive for hospitals to disrupt their operations by drastically 
and continually manipulating charges. 
Id. 
 176. Id. 
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loophole open but vowed to “continue to investigate potential 
improvements in the measurement of case level costs.”177 
 CMS repeatedly declined to implement specific reforms to the 
outlier payment methodology to address the identified loophole.178  
CMS annually reviews all aspects of PPS and updates the payment 
rates and formulas, including the outlier threshold, through notice 
and comment rulemaking.  As recently as September 2002, when 
CMS issued the fiscal year 2003 annual inpatient PPS update, the 
agency again declined to address the outlier loophole.179  The agency 
identified two factors contributing to a rise in outlier payments in 
recent years: first, a trend of hospital charge increases; and, second, 
Medicare contractors’ delays in updating provider-specific RCCs.180  
According to CMS, those factors resulted in a higher than expected 
number of cases qualifying for outlier payments.181  To address the 
unexpected increase and maintain the statutorily required five-to-
six-percent outlier pool, CMS increased the outlier threshold by as 
much as sixty percent from 2002 to 2003.182  A higher threshold 
results in fewer cases qualifying for outlier payments.  In CMS’s 
view, hospitals’ “inappropriate” charge inflation “caused” the 
threshold to increase.183  But the agency declined to directly regulate 
hospital charges.184 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170 (providing instructions on mitigating 
vulnerability but not making any changes). 
 179. See CMS, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM INTERMEDIARIES, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 
2003 PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM (PPS) HOSPITAL, SKILLED NURSING FACILITY 
(SNF) AND OTHER BILL PROCESSING CHANGES, TRANSMITTAL A-02-084 (2002) 
(outlining changes but not addressing outlier loophole), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A02084.pdf. 
 180. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective 
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,982, 50,124 
(Aug. 1, 2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405).  Id.  Specifically, CMS’s data 
showed that the average covered charge per case was $15,215 in 1999, $16,376 
in 2000, and $18,015, in 2001.  The charge per case increased, on average, by 
7.63% from 1999 to 2000, and by ten percent from 2000 to 2001.  Id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See supra note 180 (listing recent years’ outlier threshold amounts and 
percentage increases).  CMS proposed to increase the threshold from $33,560 
for FFY 2003 to $50,645 for FFY 2004.  Medicare Program; Change in 
Methodology for Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases 
(Cost Outliers) Under Acute Care Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care 
Hospital Prospective Payment Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494, 34,496 
(June 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412). 
 183. “Because the fixed-loss threshold is determined based on hospitals’ 
historical charge data, hospitals that have been inappropriately maximizing 
their outlier payments have caused the threshold to increase dramatically for 
FY 2003, and even more dramatically for the proposed IPPS FY 2004 outlier 
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3. Outlier Initiative 
In late 2002, about a year after Enron filed for bankruptcy and 
over a decade after Medicare authorities first acknowledged the 
unintended loophole in the cost outlier formula, CMS announced an 
initiative to identify “problematic” hospitals, meaning hospitals that, 
in recent years, received particularly high levels of outlier payments 
or rapidly increased charges.185  The identified hospitals included 
many of Tenet’s 114 facilities.  Through strongly worded public 
statements, audits of hospital billing and charging practices, and 
other tactics, regulators pressured hospitals to rein in their charges 
and implement other self-policing measures.186 
CMS announced the Medicare outlier payment initiative 
through a series of informal instructions to local Medicare FIs.187  
The program memoranda instructed FIs to identify providers that 
either received outlier payments representing specified, relatively 
high percentages of overall Medicare DRG payments or increased 
charges by specified percentages.188  The identified “problematic” 
hospitals then would be subject to closer scrutiny from FIs or the 
Office of Inspector General through review of charge structures and 
case-by-case audits of randomly selected patient files.189  In sharp 
contrast to the agency’s previous hands-off approach to the potential 
 
threshold of $50,645.”  Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,496.  Another 
revision intended to rein in outlier payments was to adjust the outlier formula 
for inflation using providers’ charges rather than costs.  Changes to the 
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems, 67 Fed. Reg. at 50,124. 
 184. See Medicare Program; Proposed Change in Methodology for 
Determining Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) 
Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 10,420, 10,425 (Mar. 5, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412). 
 185. See CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170. 
 186. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROGRAM 
MEMORANDUM INTERMEDIARIES, INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING HOSPITAL OUTLIER 
PAYMENTS, TRANSMITTAL NO. A-02-126 (2002) [hereinafter CMS, INSTRUCTIONS] 
(instructing intermediaries to perform comprehensive field audits and medical 
reviews), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A02126.pdf; 
Press Release, supra note 168 (announcing proposed regulation designed to halt 
“gaming” of the outlier system). 
 187. See CMS INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 186; see also CMS NOTICE, supra 
note 170; CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROGRAM 
MEMORANDUM INTERMEDIARIES, CALCULATING PROVIDER-SPECIFIC MEDICARE 
OUTPATIENT COST-TO-CHARGE RATIOS (CCRS) AND INSTRUCTIONS ON COST REPORT 
TREATMENT OF HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT SERVICES PAID ON A REASONABLE COST-
BASIS, TRANSMITTAL NO. A-03-004 (2003) [hereinafter CMS, CALCULATING] 
(providing guidelines for determining cost-to charge ratios), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm_trans/ A03004.pdf. 
 188. CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170. 
 189. CMS, INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 186. 
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for charge inflation under PPS, CMS took an aggressive stance 
under this new initiative.  In the words of CMS Administrator 
Thomas Scully: “Any hospital billing very high outlier rates better 
be absolutely sure that they are right or they are likely to be very 
sorry.”190  CMS vowed to scrutinize “all operations of the targeted 
hospitals” for any “improper conduct,” including “any billing trends 
or other indications of inappropriate reimbursement.”191  Separately, 
a congressional committee sent letters to hospitals suspected of 
overcharging and publicized the list of hospitals that received the 
letter.192 
 CMS’s outlier initiative culminated in formal rulemaking that 
amended certain aspects of the outlier payment regulations.193  In 
particular, the new regulations addressed the RCC lag time by 
authorizing fiscal intermediaries to update providers’ RCCs without 
waiting on final, audited cost reports.  Fiscal intermediaries were 
further authorized to make year-end, retrospective adjustments to 
outlier payments based on hospitals’ most recently settled but not 
final cost reports.194  Those year-end adjustments allowed fiscal 
intermediaries to capture any provider charge inflation that 
occurred during the current payment period.195  The final rule also 
 
 190. Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS to 
Clamp Down on Hospitals for Overcharging for Complex Cases (Dec. 3, 2002), 
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=661.   
 191. Id. 
 192. Committee News Release, The Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Tauzin, Greenwood Investigate Hospital Billing Disparities for the Uninsured 
(July 16, 2003) (regarding the problem of billing full charges to uninsured 
patients), at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/07162003_1040print. 
htm; see infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text (discussing the uninsured 
charges issue). 
 193. See Medicare Program; Change in Methodology for Determining 
Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under Acute Care 
Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment 
Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494 (June 9, 2003); Medicare Program; 
Proposed Change in Methodology for Determining Payment for Extraordinarily 
High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,420, 10,425 (Mar. 5, 2003) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (providing an abbreviated 30-day, instead of 
statutory 60-day, comment period); see also CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM INTERMEDIARIES, CHANGE IN METHODOLOGY 
FOR DETERMINING PAYMENT FOR OUTLIERS UNDER THE ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL 
INPATIENT AND LONG-TERM CARE HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS, 
TRANSMITTAL NO. A-03-058 (2003) (providing the first set of instructions to fiscal 
intermediaries implementing the revised outlier regulations), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm_trans/A03058.pdf. 
 194. Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,509. 
 195. Id. at 34,499 (establishing a new regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(i)(1), 
W06-WEEKS VERSION 2.DOC 12/6/2005  10:18 AM 
2005] GAUGING THE COST OF LOOPHOLES 1255 
eliminated the reversion to the statewide average RCC for hospitals 
falling below the lower limit.196  Providers with RCCs exceeding the 
upper limit and providers without historical cost and charge data 
could still revert to the statewide RCC to calculate outlier 
adjustments.197 
B. Health Care Pricing 
The one aspect of the outlier payment methodology that CMS 
did not address in informal memoranda, press releases, or the 
formal outlier regulations is the one feature that CMS expressly 
identified as the root of the problem—hospital charge inflation.  The 
most likely explanation for this omission is that CMS lacks 
authority to regulate charges.  As the preamble to the new outlier 
regulations expressly states: “Hospitals set their own level of 
charges and are able to change their charges, without review by 
their fiscal intermediaries.”198  This statement confirms CMS’s 
historical understanding that the agency has no authority to 
regulate hospital pricing or charge structures. 
1. Medicare Regulation of Pricing 
A fundamental principle of the Medicare program is regulatory 
noninterference with health care providers’ business activities, 
including establishing charges for services and supplies.  The 
preamble to the Social Security Act, provides: “Nothing in this title 
[of the Social Security Act] shall be construed to authorize any 
Federal officer or employee . . . to exercise any supervision or control 
over the administration or operation of any such institution, agency, 
or person.”199  A key function of hospital administration is to 
establish and update charges for medical supplies and services.  
Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision 
suggests that the government lacks authority to supervise or control 
hospitals’ charging practices or price increases.200 
 
authorizing CMS to instruct fiscal intermediaries to use updated, non-final data 
and allowing providers to request use of the same data); id. at 34,504 
(establishing a new section, 412.84(i)(3), regarding year-end reconciliation, and 
indicating that CMS would issue further instructions to fiscal intermediaries 
through program memoranda). 
 196. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing former 
regulation). 
 197. Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 34,500 (implementing revisions 
at section 412.84(h), (i)(1)). 
 198. Proposed Change in Methodology, 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,425. 
 199. Social Security Act § 1801, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000). 
 200. For the most part, the federal government has complied with this 
directive.  Attempts to regulate hospital charges were either short-lived or 
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Out of apparent respect for that principle, federal regulators 
traditionally accorded Medicare providers considerable discretion in 
setting charges and updating prices.  No Medicare regulations or 
instructions require hospitals to establish particular prices or limit 
the amount by which they may increase charges.  In fact, Medicare 
program instructions specifically prohibit the agency from 
regulating charges: “[T]he Medicare program cannot dictate to a 
provider what its charges or charge structure may be . . . .”201  But 
certain Medicare reimbursement principles and regulations could 
provide a hook for CMS to crack down on charge inflation under the 
outlier payment initiative. 
One potential hook CMS might use to regulate charges appears 
in the old Medicare cost reimbursement regulations.  Prior to PPS 
implementation, hospitals were paid the lower of their reasonable 
costs or customary charges (“LCC”).202  The LCC regulations defined 
“customary charges” as “the regular rates that providers charge both 
beneficiaries and other paying patients for the services furnished to 
them.”203  Similarly, Medicare program instructions interpreted the 
LCC regulation to mean that “customary charges” are charges 
actually “imposed uniformly on most patients.”204  The Medicare 
instructions provide further that “customary charges” must 
“actually be collected from a substantial percentage of patients 
liable for payment on a charge basis.”205  The intent of those 
requirements was to prevent providers from gouging the 
government with high prices while offering discounts or write-offs to 
commercial payors.  In practice, however, commercial insurers 
typically negotiate discounted or special rates, and the government 
pays based on DRGs or fee schedules.  Accordingly, the only 
“[p]atients liable for payment on a charge basis” are self-pay or 
 
never enacted.  For example, President Nixon’s Economic Stabilization Program 
(“ESP”), which was in place from November 1971 to April 1974, implemented 
national wage and price controls, including hospital rate controls.  See 
ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 132, at 481-83; see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 423 (1982) (noting that providers 
responded to price controls by increasing volume and, after ESP was repealed, 
increased fees to compensate for the losses).  In 1977, President Carter 
proposed to limit hospital rate increases to 1.5% of the gross consumer price 
index and to cap such increases at nine percent annually, but the proposal 
failed.  See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 132, at 484; STARR, supra, at 412. 
 201. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL § 2203 (1997) [hereinafter MANUAL]. 
 202. 42 C.F.R. § 413.1(b) (2004). 
 203. Id.  § 413.13(a). 
 204. MANUAL, supra note 201, § 2604.3. 
 205. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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uninsured patients.206  Read together, the LCC regulations and 
interpreting instructions create an incentive for aggressive 
collection practices against uninsured patients.207 
Also, Medicare cost-reimbursement principles emphasize 
uniformity, meaning that providers must charge the same rates to 
all payors—commercial insurers, government health care programs, 
and self-pay patients.  The principle of uniform charges created a 
pitfall, however, because hospitals interpreted the principle as 
requiring them to charge all patients, including the uninsured, the 
same list price and disallowing price adjustments, discounts, or 
sliding-scales based on patients’ ability to pay.208  Accordingly, 
Tenet’s practice of charging its full, “strong” or “robust” prices to 
uninsured patients arguably was necessary to comply with Medicare 
rules.  But that practice of demanding full charges from uninsured 
patients attracted public scorn and lawsuits alleging price-
gouging.209 
Other regulations, no longer applicable under PPS, echo the 
uniformity principle and suggest additional limits on providers’ 
discretion in establishing charges.  According to cost reimbursement 
regulations, charges should be “reasonable” and bear some relation 
to the actual cost of care.210  In their annual cost reports, providers 
must distinguish between reimbursable costs, meaning costs 
attributable to serving Medicare patients, and excluded costs, 
meaning costs attributable to treating non-Medicare patients.211  The 
regulations and instructions regarding this “cost apportionment” 
process provide: “Charges means the regular rates for various 
services that are charged to both beneficiaries and other paying 
patients who receive the services.  Implicit in the use of charges as 
 
 206. See id. § 2604.3(B)(1). 
 207. CMS, in other contexts, has similarly addressed incentives to collect 
from uninsured patients, specifically encouraging providers to pursue collection 
practices.  For example, in proposing changes to reduce the amount of extra 
Medicare payments available to hospitals for “bad debt,” the agency noted that 
the current liberal bad-debt policy “provides an incentive to the provider to 
forego effective collection efforts in return for the certainty of Medicare 
payments.”  Medicare Program; Provider Bad Debt Payment, 68 Fed. Reg. 
6,682, 6,684 (Feb. 10, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 413). 
 208. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing Health & 
Human Services’ and the Inspector General’s responses to hospitals’ pricing 
practices towards the uninsured). 
 209. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing lawsuits and 
Tenet’s response). 
 210. 42 C.F.R. § 413.9 (2004). 
 211. Id.  §§  413.9, 413.20. 
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the basis for apportionment is the objective that charges for services 
be related to the cost of the services.”212 
Medicare instructions interpreting the regulation specify that 
“each facility should have an established charge structure which is 
applied uniformly to each patient” and “which is reasonably and 
consistently related to the cost of providing the services.”213  
Although CMS could rely on those provisions to regulate hospital 
charges, the provisions are phrased in precatory rather than 
mandatory terms, which leave room to argue that charges “should” 
be, but are not necessarily required to be, uniform. 
A final reference to hospital charges appears in the Social 
Security Act and Medicare regulations pertaining to the Office of 
Inspector General’s (“OIG”) enforcement authority.214  The OIG is 
authorized to impose civil and criminal fines and exclude providers 
from participating in the Medicare program for particular 
misconduct.215  Specifically, the OIG may exclude a provider that has 
“[s]ubmitted, or caused to be submitted, bills or requests for 
payments under Medicare . . . containing charges or costs for items 
or services furnished that are substantially in excess of such 
individual or entity’s usual charges or costs for such items or 
services.”216  Less strongly worded than the LCC and cost 
apportionment regulations, the OIG regulations do not require 
uniform charges or charges that bear relation to costs.  The OIG 
provision requires only that the provider’s charges to the 
government are usual and not “substantially in excess” of amounts 
charged to other payors.217 
CMS is gradually abandoning charge-based payment in many 
areas of the Medicare program, but the OIG provision has recently 
been given new teeth.  Recent agency guidance now clarifies that the 
OIG has discretion in imposing sanctions, including program 
exclusion, for providers submitting claims for amounts 
“substantially in excess” of usual charges and notes a statutory good 
cause exception.218  Also, the OIG proposed amendments that would 
 
 212. Id.  § 413.53(b)(2)(ii).  
 213. MANUAL, supra note 201, § 2203. 
 214. See generally Social Security Act §§ 1128-1129A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7 
to 1320a-8b (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001-08 (2004). 
 215. See Social Security Act §§ 1128A-11298B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a to 
1320a-7b; 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001, 1003. 
 216. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.701(a)(1); see also Social Security Act § 1128(b)(6), 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6) (regarding the OIG’s permissive exclusion authority for 
excessive charges). 
 217. See Social Security Act § 1128(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 1001.701(a)(1). 
 218. See HHS, HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS, supra note 118, at 1-2 (addressing 
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explicitly define the key terms “substantially in excess” and “usual 
charges.”219  In the preamble to the proposed rule, the OIG expressed 
concern over charge inflation and noted the continued relevance of 
charges, even after PPS implementation.  Specifically, the notice 
identifies that Medicare Part B and “[o]ther Medicare payment 
provisions, such as the inpatient outlier payment methodology, also 
depend in whole or part on a provider’s costs or charges.”220  The 
renewed attention to the OIG regulations suggests the direction in 
which authorities may be headed in regulating hospital charges, 
despite the historical hands-off approach. 
In addition to concern over outlier payments, the uninsured 
charges issue and the Tenet pricing abuse lawsuits prompted CMS 
to issue various guidance statements on hospital practices.  The 
agency disavowed any interpretation of Medicare regulations that 
would require hospitals to demand full charges or engage in 
aggressive collection practices against uninsured patients.  The 
agency asserts that the recent statements “reflect[] no change to 
existing policy.”221  Despite CMS’s announced policy on hospital 
charges and uninsured patients, Medicare providers still may 
rationally fear both informal and formal sanctions for violating the 
uniform charges and other provisions.222  First, Medicare regulations 
are notoriously indeterminate.223  In addition, CMS has a history of 
regulatory indifference followed by unexpected, zealous 
 
providers’ concerns that offering discounts to uninsured patients would violate 
various program laws and guidance). 
 219. See id. at 2; Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and 
Abuse; Clarification of Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority 
for Submitting Claims Containing Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939, 
53,940-43 (Sept. 15, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412). 
 220. Clarification of Terms, 68 Fed. Reg. at 53,940. 
 221. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDLEARN MATTERS: 
INFORMATION FOR MEDICARE PROVIDERS, REMINDER: HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS 
PERMITTED FOR INDIGENT, UNINSURED, AND UNDERINSURED PATIENTS, NO. 
SE0405, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medlearn/matters/mmarticles/ 
2004/SE0405.pdf. 
 222. See id.; News Release, supra note 118 (“Your letter suggests that HHS 
regulations require hospitals to bill all patients using the same schedule of 
charges and suggests that as a result, the uninsured are forced to pay ‘full price’ 
for their care.  That suggestion is not correct and certainly does not accurately 
reflect my policy.”).  See generally CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, QUESTIONS ON CHARGES FOR THE UNINSURED (Feb. 17, 2004) 
(discussing various implications of CMS and OIG regulations on charges to 
uninsured patients and providing that discounts to uninsured patients do not 
affect a provider’s RCC as long as full charges are listed on the Medicare cost 
report), available at http://cms.hhs.gov/FAQ_Uninsured.pdf. 
 223. See, e.g., Clarification of Terms, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,340. 
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enforcement.224  Informal sanctions might include audits and 
investigations of hospital charges, such as the audits announced in 
the outlier program memoranda.  Moreover, the government has 
authority to impose formal sanctions, including steep fines and loss 
of all Medicare revenue through program exclusion, for health care 
fraud and abuse.225  Finally, CMS followed a similar strategy to 
reduce overcharges in an analogous context—prescription drug 
prices under Medicare and Medicaid. 
2. Prescription Drug Pricing Analogy 
Another Medicare and Medicaid loophole, similar to the outlier 
loophole, allows providers to increase reimbursement by increasing 
charges for pharmaceutical products.  Under Medicare Part B, the 
Medicaid program, prescription drugs were reimbursed according to 
formulas based on the drugs’ average wholesale price (“AWP”).226  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and suppliers were free to set the 
AWP, just as hospitals were free to set hospital charges.227  Until 
recently, drug pricing issues under Medicare were limited to a 
narrow class of Part B outpatient drugs because drugs prescribed to 
patients during inpatient hospital stays are included in the bundled 
DRG payments.228 
The recently enacted Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”)229 
dramatically overhauled Medicare coverage, adding a broad 
prescription drug benefit for outpatient drugs.  The legislation 
codifies the Medicare noninterference policy and expressly prohibits 
the government from negotiating with pharmaceutical companies on 
 
 224. See, e.g., infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text (describing the 
prescription drug pricing crack-down). 
 225. See David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, 
Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 
550 (2001) (describing a history of inconsistent enforcement and potential for 
steep sanctions when regulatory priorities change). 
 226. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(o)(1) (2000). 
 227. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (describing Medicare 
PPS and DRG payment structure for inpatient hospital care).  The cost of drugs 
and biologics supplied to hospital inpatients, under Medicare Part A, are 
bundled into the DRG payment.  Drugs and biologics furnished to an inpatient 
for use outside the hospital, i.e., post-discharge or as a hospital outpatient, 
other than a limited supply necessary to facilitate discharge, generally are not 
covered under Part A.  See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE CARRIERS MANUAL, Part 3, Claims Process 
§ 3101(3)(E) (1984) [hereinafter CARRIERS MANUAL]. 
 229. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
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the price of drugs purchased for Medicare beneficiaries, despite the 
fact that the sheer volume of drugs purchased and other factors give 
the government a strong bargaining position.  Drug pricing under 
the new Part D benefit is worked out between private insurance 
companies sponsoring the drug benefit230 and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.  Specifically, the MMA provides: 
In order to promote competition under this part and in 
carrying out this part, the Secretary—(1) may not interfere 
with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and 
pharmacies and [prescription drug plan] sponsors; and (2) may 
not require a particular formulary or institute a price 
structure for the reimbursement of covered Part D drugs.231 
 
The decision under MMA to give free rein on prescription drug 
pricing to the pharmaceutical and insurance industries drew strong 
public objection and accusations that the lawmakers drafting the 
MMA were “captured” by politically powerful lobbying groups.232  
Although such criticism may be overstated, the MMA contains not 
merely a loophole but an open invitation for pricing abuses.  
Regulations implementing the new Part D prescription drug benefit 
took effect on March 22, 2005, and the drug pricing issue promises 
 
 230. These are referred to as Pharmacy Benefits Managers or “PBMs.”  See 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003        
§ 303. 
 231. Id. § 101 (describing “noninterference”). 
 232. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, New Drug Law’s Cost Impact Debated; Some 
Question Whether Insurance Companies Will Get Lower Prices, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 9, 2004, at A3 (noting that the government could have cut drug costs in 
half by using its purchasing power to negotiate lower prices, the way the VA 
does, and quoting Senator Edward Kennedy as stating, “[t]he single most 
irresponsible provision in the Medicare bill is the prohibition that prevents 
Medicare from negotiating lower-priced prescription drugs”); Editorial, Give 
Medicare Power to Bargain on Drug Costs, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 12, 2004, at 6A 
(“The anti-bargaining provision only makes sense from the perspective of 
pharmaceutical makers, who want full price for their wares, or private health-
care companies, that will now have a competitive edge against Medicare.”); 
Judith A. Stein, Don’t Give Medicare Away to Private Plans, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Feb. 10, 2004, at A9 (noting that the “new Medicare law includes 
another certain prescription for skyrocketing costs.  Adding insult to injury, it 
explicitly prohibits the government from negotiating discounted prices with 
pharmaceutical companies on behalf of the 41 million Medicare beneficiaries.”); 
John O’Neil, Medi-SCARE, NEA TODAY, Mar. 1, 2004, at 34 (listing among the 
problems in the new law, “[n]o controls on runaway drug costs. . . .  [I]n the face 
of fierce lobbying by the drug industry, the new law specifically forbade the 
federal government from negotiating with suppliers to rein in drug costs.”). 
W06-WEEKS VERSION 2.DOC 12/6/2005  10:18 AM 
1262 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
to remain a central point of controversy as the program takes 
effect.233 
 Past experience with drug pricing under government health 
care programs suggests that lawmakers’ current acquiescence to the 
industry’s price setting may not persist.  Regulators responded to 
public pressure and attacked the AWP loophole through price 
reviews and threatened enforcement action, despite any clear 
authority to regulate drug prices.  Under Medicare Part B, 
pharmacies and other suppliers received the lower of billed charges 
or ninety-five percent of the AWP.234  Under Medicaid, most states 
reimburse pharmacies the AWP, less a percentage discount.235  
Although the government lacks clear authority to regulate charges, 
it nevertheless scrutinized and threatened sanctions against 
providers for alleged prescription drug overcharges.236 
CMS recently conducted a nationwide review of pharmacy 
pricing and concluded that the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
were being significantly overcharged for prescription drugs because 
the AWP is not the actual price that pharmacies pay for drugs.237  
 
 233. See Medicare Program: Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 4194 (Jan. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 403, 411, 417, 
423). 
 234. 42 C.F.R. § 405.517(b) (2004) (explaining the payment for drugs and 
biologics are not paid on a cost or prospective payment basis).  Medicare Part B 
provided limited prescription drug coverage for certain drugs and biologics 
furnished to outpatients, e.g., clotting agents for hemophilia, Social Security Act 
§ 1861(s)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)(I) (2000); immunosuppressive drugs for            
organ transplant recipients, Social Security Act § 1861(s)(2)(J), 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1395x(s)(2)(J); oral cancer chemotherapy drugs, Social Security Act                 
§§ 1861(s)(2)(Q), (t)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(s)(2)(Q), (t)(2); hepatitis B vaccines 
for certain individuals, Social Security Act § 1861(s)(2)(V)(10)(B), 42 U.S.C.          
§ 1395x(s)(2)(V)(10)(B); and flu vaccines furnished under state law, CARRIERS 
MANUAL, supra note 228, § 2049(4)(B)(3).  See also 42 C.F.R. § 419.64(d) (2004) 
(stating that outpatient reimbursement is ninety-five percent of AWP minus the 
ambulatory payment classification (“APC”) amount).  Under the Medicare 
outpatient prospective payment system (“OPPS”), APCs are fixed payment 
categories analogous to DRGs under inpatient PPS.  See id. § 419.31. 
 235. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICAID PHARMACY—ACTUAL ACQUISITION COST OF GENERIC 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS, REP. NO. A-06-01-00053 (2002) [hereinafter 
HHS, GENERIC] (describing prescription drug reimbursement under states’ 
Medicaid programs); see also U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICAID PHARMACY—ACTUAL ACQUISITION COST OF BRAND 
NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS, REP. NO. A-06-00-00023 (2001) 
[hereinafter HHS, BRAND NAME] (describing prescription drug reimbursement 
under states’ Medicaid programs). 
 236. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing CMS’s authority to regulate charges). 
 237. See generally HHS, GENERIC, supra note 235; HHS, BRAND NAME, supra 
note 235; see also Medicare Payments for Currently Covered Prescription Drugs: 
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The AWP is the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s “list price” for the 
drug, similar to a hospital’s list price or full charges for medical 
treatment.  But like hospitals, drug manufacturers typically offer 
discounts to certain buyers, such as pharmacies and other wholesale 
purchasers.238  As a result, the only purchaser being charged the full 
AWP or list price for drugs was the government.  The government 
alleged that manufacturers’ “manipulation of AWPs” caused the 
significant overpayments and, accordingly, sought to bring 
reimbursement levels “more in line with the actual acquisition 
costs.”239 
CMS further suggested that the practice of inflating AWPs for 
purposes of increasing government health care program 
reimbursement could be actionable under the federal civil False 
Claims Act (“FCA”).240  Medicare-participating hospitals are aware of 
the high stakes for exploiting loopholes, even if the conduct is not 
clearly prohibited.  Medicare regulators previously have turned to 
the FCA and other laws to sanction conduct that previously seemed 
tacitly, if not openly, acceptable but later became an enforcement 
 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
107th Cong. 9-13 (2002) (statement of CMS Administrator Thomas A. Scully 
regarding Part B overpayment for drugs). 
 238. See generally HHS, BRAND NAME, supra note 235. 
 239. HHS, GENERIC, supra note 235, App. 3 (reprinting CMS Administrator 
Scully’s letter to Inspector General Janet Rehnquist); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICAID PHARMACY—
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF THE ACTUAL ACQUISITION COST OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
PRODUCTS, REP. NO. A-06-02-00041 (2002) (proposing a four-tiered 
reimbursement methodology).  As with the outlier formula, the potential for 
providers to increase drug reimbursement levels by increasing charges was not 
a new revelation for federal regulators.  As early as 1975, the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) attempted to control Medicare and 
Medicaid drug costs, under the Maximum Allowable Cost initiative.  See Limits 
on Payments for Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,512, 34,516 (Aug. 15, 1975); 
Limitations on Payment or Reimbursement for Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 32,283, 
32,284 (July 31, 1975). 
 240. See Draft OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,060 (Oct. 3, 2002) (explaining that the 
federal government sets reimbursement rates for pharmaceuticals “with the 
expectation that the data provided are complete and accurate,” that 
manufacturers’ reported prices “should accurately take into account price 
reductions, rebates, up-front payments, coupons, goods in kind, free or reduced 
price services, grants or other price concessions or similar benefits offered to 
some or all purchasers,” and that submission of “false, fraudulent, or misleading 
information” is actionable under the False Claims Act).  The False Claims Act 
prohibits knowingly presenting or causing to be presented to the federal 
government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.  See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1) (2000). 
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priority.241  The FCA carries steep sanctions, including treble 
damages and civil monetary penalties up to $11,000 per claim,242 
meaning each individual patient record, of which there could be 
thousands for a particular medical provider.243 
Similar to the AWP issue, the government could employ a 
strategy of accusation and innuendo to rein in hospital charges 
under the Medicare outlier payment initiative.244  Specifically, 
enforcement authorities could allege that hospital charge structures 
are grossly inflated and bear no relation to the actual prices that 
commercial insurers and others pay for inpatient services and 
supplies.  Then, they could allege that claims for Medicare outlier 
bonus payments based on inflated charges amount to a false claim 
in violation of the FCA.  Despite the lack of authority over hospital 
charges and a historical policy of noninterference toward hospital 
administration, federal authorities could resort to the open-ended 
language of FCA to sanction perceived abuses under the Medicare 
outlier adjustment.245  In light of those possibilities, health care 
providers may weigh the risks associated with the loophole heavily 
and alter otherwise beneficial pricing and other business strategies 
to avoid the potentially steep monetary and reputational sanctions. 
Before regulators embark on a campaign of closing Medicare 
loopholes, including the outlier adjustment, the collateral economic 
effects of stifling private market competition and innovation should 
be considered.  The dual government and private health care 
delivery systems are not coordinated and may offer competing 
incentives.  The current trend in health care reform is to increase 
reliance on privatization, competition, and market-based strategies 
as ways of reducing costs and improving quality and efficiency.  
Therefore, it is especially important that regulators implement any 
 
 241. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 550-52 (discussing problems of 
“speakeasy” enforcement of health care fraud and abuse under an over 
inclusive, highly indeterminate FCA provision). 
 242. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (listing civil monetary penalties under the FCA); 
42 C.F.R. § 1003.103(c) (2004) (stating that the “OIG may impose a penalty of 
not more than $11,000 for each payment for which there was a failure to report 
required information”) (footnote omitted). 
 243. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 536 (noting that “[b]ecause most health 
care providers typically submit a large number of modest claims, this structure 
means that statutory penalties generally dwarf actual damages and quickly rise 
to staggering levels”); Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 247-48 (noting that 
“[h]ealth care providers tend to file large numbers of small claims, often 
amounting to thousands of claims over the course of a year” and that 
“penalties . . . can literally run into hundreds of millions of dollars”). 
 244. See While & Lee, supra note 114 (quoting CMS Administrator Scully: 
“If you have true costs, great.  If not, we are going to come looking for you.”). 
 245. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. 
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changes to the Medicare program only after fully considering the 
risks posed by historical loopholes and secondary effects of closing 
them on both the overall regulatory scheme and private market.  In 
Tenet’s case, CMS’s Medicare outlier initiative deterred potentially 
innovative market strategies that might have provided useful 
guidance in forthcoming health care policy discussions. 
V. ANALYSIS 
In the current health care environment of declining 
reimbursement and rising costs, hospitals—and not just for-profit 
hospitals like Tenet, but also non-profit, community, and teaching 
hospitals—look for ways to offset losses in losing cost centers by 
increasing revenue or reimbursement in other areas.  “Cost-shifting” 
is standard operating procedure for hospitals in the current health 
care market squeeze.  Accordingly, hospitals may identify regulatory 
incentives, including loopholes, as potentially lucrative sources of 
additional income. 
The easy answer to the problem of Medicare loopholes is simply 
to close them and thereby eliminate the temptation.  But loopholes 
are inevitable and pervasive in complex regulatory schemes like the 
tax code and Medicare reimbursement methodology.246  Regulators 
may lack resources to quickly spot and close the loopholes.  On the 
other hand, regulators may be fully aware of loopholes but may 
rationally weigh the costs and benefits of closing the loopholes and 
make a conscious choice not to leave them open, as occurred for 
many years with the Medicare outlier payment formula.  But public 
pressure or concern over “cheating” may cause regulators to re-
prioritize and reconsider settled issues.247  The standard approach to 
closing loopholes through statutory or regulatory amendment may 
be slow or cumbersome because formal legislative or administrative 
channels must be navigated.  Public pressure for speedy response 
may drive regulators to employ shortcuts and informal methods of 
tightening loopholes or otherwise addressing the Medicare 
“pollutant of the month.”248  In addition, the impatient public may 
 
 246. Editorial, See The Real Tenet Scandal, supra note 2 (regarding the 
inevitability of loopholes in Medicare regulatory system).  Cf. Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn Anyone Into a Crook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2000, 
at A18 (noting the “unrivaled” regulatory complexity of the Medicare program 
and tendency of “spooked” hospital executives to cave to enforcement actions 
rather than litigate). 
 247. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 550 (observing that “when 
administrative priorities change, conduct that everyone in the industry thought 
was acceptable can suddenly become exhibit A in a criminal and civil case”). 
 248. “In the context of environmental legislation, it encourages the well-
known ‘pollutant of the month’ syndrome, where regulation is driven by recent 
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not wait for official response, applying a range of informal sanctions 
against identified wrongdoers.249  Social norms and informal 
sanctions, in some cases, may compliment government 
enforcement.250  But those approaches more often will lead to over-
deterrence or misguided responses by the sanctioned actors.  
Without the deliberative, albeit slow, process that characterizes 
administrative policy changes, society’s attempted “cure” may be 
much more harmful than the perceived “cancer” sought to be 
eliminated. 
A. Gauging the Cost of Loopholes 
The Medicare program, by design, contains payment incentives 
directing health care providers’ operations.251  For example, in 
implementing inpatient PPS, regulators intended providers to limit 
unnecessary services and inflationary spending.  Moreover, by 
restricting payment for inpatient care under PPS, while outpatient 
 
and memorable instances of harm.”  Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra 
note 4, at 1518 (regarding anecdote-driven environment legislation and noting 
that reliance on “how ‘available’ other instances of the harm in question are” is 
a fully rational judgment error that nevertheless can lead to systemic errors); 
see also Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 691-701 (discussing the Love Canal, 
Alar pesticide, and other examples). 
 249. Decentralized enforcement through social norms may offer a faster, 
more responsive approach than centralized enforcement to police private 
conduct.  See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1643, 1655 (1996) (describing alternative views that social norms are either 
hard to change because a procedure for reform does not exist or easy to change 
because reform does not require formal procedures).  Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law, 
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1700-01 (1996) 
(refuting the notion that decentralized rulemaking is more effective and 
streamlined than centralized rulemaking).     
 250. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 127 (1991) (describing 
norms as rules emanating from social forces and laws as rules emanating from 
government); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation 
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as “informal social 
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized 
sense of duty, because of fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both”); Richard 
A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special 
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999) (providing 
examples, including table manners, grammar rules, country club regulations, 
standard business practices, and lying, which may be independent of, or overlap 
with, laws). 
 251. See Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 250 (noting that “payment 
systems unavoidably provide incentives for certain kinds of provider behavior—
for example, the provision, of more, or of higher quality, or of more cost-effective 
health care goods and services.  Payment systems are often consciously 
designed to promote such goals.”). 
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care remained under the old, potentially more lucrative cost-based 
reimbursement program, regulators intended for hospitals to divert 
resources to outpatient treatment.252  Responding to that incentive, 
hospitals closed some acute care inpatient units and opened new, 
long-term care units, which were reimbursed as outpatient 
services.253 
Since PPS implementation, providers have identified various 
unintended incentives, or loopholes, to increase Medicare 
reimbursement under the fixed DRG payments.254  For example, 
providers quickly recognized that by “upcoding,” or classifying 
patients’ conditions as more complex or acute than medically 
indicated, they could collect higher DRG payment amounts.255  The 
 
 252. See Stephenson v. Shalala, 87 F.3d 350, 355 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
after inpatient PPS implementation “permitting outpatient charges to rise is 
consistent with Congress’ goal of encouraging a diversion of resources toward 
outpatient treatment. . . . By increasing the rate of return to outpatient vis-à-vis 
inpatient procedures, Congress effectively increased the incentive to supply 
outpatient services.”).  
 253. See Theodore M. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: 
Legitimate Business or Unethical “Entrepreneurialism”, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 
64 (1989) (noting that providers responded to PPS implementation by shifting 
services to non-hospital settings).  Cf. George Anders, A Plan to Cut Back On 
Medicare Expenses Goes Awry; Costs Soar: Hospitals Rush to Remodel To Offer 
Subacute Care – And Get Paid Twice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1996, at A1, reprinted 
in ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 132, at 486-87 (suggesting that “incomplete 
and imperfect efforts to contain [Medicare] costs” fall on elderly and disabled 
because hospitals identify alternative reimbursement strategies rather than 
reduce costs). 
 254. As one commentator summarized: 
Health-care providers have been gaming Medicare since that federal 
insurance program evolved into a system of Soviet-style price controls 
in the 1980s.  Medicare pays a fixed amount for a treatment, 
regardless of costs, and in turn companies search for loopholes in the 
system’s 100,000 pages of regulations to make up the difference.  
Sooner or later Medicare discovers the “loophole,” closes it and the 
cycle starts all over. 
Editorial, The Real Tenet Scandal, supra note 2, at A14; see also Editorial, 
Tenet’s Shareholder Ills, supra note 2, at A10 (“As we’ve said before, Tenet’s 
mistake wasn’t in getting what it could from Medicare loopholes, but that it 
didn’t let shareholders know that the windfall couldn’t last.”).  See generally 
Richard M. Cooper, Objectionable Conduct, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 20, 2003, at 16 
(noting that “[m]arket forces respond to incentives; and in virtually all markets, 
even the unlawful ones, the government significantly affects the incentives to 
which buyers and sellers respond” and discussing regulatory incentives in 
Medicare prescription drug reimbursement policy).  Cf. Hyman, supra note 225, 
at 542 (suggesting that, under cost-contained health care payment systems, 
physicians may believe that the only way to provide high-quality care is to 
manipulate reimbursement rules). 
 255. See, e.g., David Wessel, Medicare Cures: Easy to Prescribe, Tricky to 
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Medicare outlier adjustment was another incentive built into PPS 
regulatory framework.  Day outlier payments created an incentive to 
keep patients in the hospital extra days.  Cost outlier payments also 
created incentives—an intended incentive to treat the sickest and 
most needy Medicare patients and an unintended incentive for 
charge inflation. 
 As a matter of basic microeconomics, perhaps none of those 
strategies was unexpected or irrational.  In each instance, hospitals 
were acting as rational profit-maximizing firms.  But as a normative 
matter, many of us would consider at least some of the conduct 
objectionable. 256  Practices such as upcoding or extending lengths of 
stay may be consistent with individual wealth maximization but 
may misallocate societal resources if a provider receives 
reimbursement that greatly exceeds the actual costs of caring for the 
patient.  The Medicare program is supported by a limited pool of 
federal funds, derived from general revenue and federal payroll tax, 
 
Predict, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at A1 (describing a pneumonia upcoding 
probe to crack-down on improper coding of “high-risk pneumonia” and reporting 
that a 1993 government study of 17,000 pneumonia cases found that only 3.3% 
were classified as “low-risk,” a much lower figure than medical evidence 
suggests); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing Tenet’s 
settlement of pneumonia upcoding charge settlement).  Several other strategies 
have been the focus of government enforcement initiatives, such as “Operation 
Bad Bundle,” which targeted hospitals’ attempts to collect higher 
reimbursement for certain laboratory tests by billing the tests individually, or 
“unbundled,” rather than as a panel or “bundle” of tests as required by 
regulations.  The Physicians at Teaching Hospitals (“PATH”) audits, targeted 
improper billing for services provided by supervising physicians at academic 
medical centers.  The “72-Hour DRG Payment Window” initiative involves a 
Medicare regulation that requires hospitals to include services furnished to 
inpatients within seventy-two hours before or after admission as part of the 
bundled DRG payment, rather than billing separately for hospital outpatient 
services.  Another DRG-related issue involves billing hospital transfers as 
discharges so that each hospital receives the full DRG amount.  Medicare 
regulations provide that only the transferee hospital receives the DRG 
payment, while the transferring hospital receives a per-diem amount.  See 
Hyman, supra note 225, at 555 (listing OIG enforcement initiatives aimed at 
hospital billing practices); Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 255-57 (describing 
national health care fraud and abuse enforcement initiatives). 
 256. See, e.g., Said, supra note 77, at A1 (describing a health care analyst as 
saying, “I don’t know any other way to put it.  They [Tenet] have a duty not to 
manipulate their strategies to game the system.  They just did not act as good 
corporate citizens.”).  But see Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 254 (describing a 
continuum of “beneficial to inexcusable” provider responses to incentives in 
government health care programs and identifying upcoding as an “enthusiastic” 
response to incentives, i.e., “responses that the designers of the incentive 
system perhaps did not contemplate, but they are not yet beyond the bounds of 
either reasonableness or manageability”). 
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with some additional contributions by Medicare beneficiaries in the 
form of premiums, deductibles, and copayments.257  But the pool of 
funds is largely fixed, meaning that excessive payments to one 
participating provider deplete funds available to pay other 
providers.  Federal dollars account for almost one-third of health 
care providers’ income.258  Providers that lose out to loophole 
exploiters may be forced to close their operations, potentially 
endangering the overall availability of health care services.  
Moreover, taxpayers face increased tax burdens if the government 
has to generate additional dollars to maintain existing Medicare 
enrollment and benefit levels.  Therefore, basic fairness, fiscal 
concerns, and market practicalities suggest some need to police 
loopholes, even if the conduct is not clearly unlawful. 
Under traditional principles of profit-maximization, firms will 
cheat as long as it is economically efficient to do so; that is, as long 
as the potential gains from cheating outweigh the potential risks.259  
Potential gains might include capturing a market advantage or 
remaining competitive in a tight market.260  Potential risks include 
 
 257. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i, 1395s (2000). 
 258. See OIG Statement, supra note 12 (citing statistics regarding 
government health care purchasing). 
 259. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an 
Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 205, 218 (1996) (noting that illegal conduct is “rampant and 
countenanced by law enforcement officials because” fraud and abuse laws and 
enforcement are “so out of sync with the conventional norms and realities of the 
marketplace”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the 
Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2000) (discussing incentives 
and observing that traders’ motivations to hide losses and fabricate profits “are 
so great that to fail to attempt such evasion is arguably irrational”); Cooper, 
supra note 254, at 16 (noting that where the “risk of detection of improper 
conduct or of strong enforcement action against it appears to be small, 
competitors will cheat, even at some risk of running afoul of laws with 
substantial penalties”); see also Eric A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Greed, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2002) (noting that “[g]reed is a problem for the state 
because greedy people are too hard to control” because they are “either so myopic 
and extreme that they do not care about legal sanctions, or they are so cold and 
calculating that they exploit all legal loopholes to their own benefit and to the 
harm of others”).  Cf. Jost & Davies, supra note 131, at 268 (noting that 
complete deterrence requires a penalty that equals or exceeds any potential 
gain from wrongful conduct); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, 
and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 349 (1997) (noting that standard economic 
conception of deterrence assumes that “[i]ndividuals commit crimes . . . when 
the expected utility of law-breaking exceeds the expected disutility of 
punishment”). 
 260. See Krawiec, supra note 259, at 335 (concluding that “market forces will 
not eliminate rouge trading” because self-interested trading benefits traders, 
management, and, to some extent, shareholders); Cooper, supra note 254, at 16 
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formal and informal sanctions.  Therefore, even if certain business 
strategies or conduct are not actually unlawful, firms may recognize 
efficiency or other rational economic reasons to resist regulatory 
loopholes.  Society may impose informal sanctions against conduct 
that violates widely held values, beliefs, or norms, including 
standards of fairness and morality.261  Informal sanctions include 
guilt, shame, stigmatization, gossip, ostracism, disapproval, 
contrition, and vengeance.262  The government may impose legal 
sanctions, including fines, incarceration, and, in the Medicare 
context, exclusion from participation in government health care 
programs.263  But lack of coordination among official and unofficial 
“regulators” may lead to under-enforcement, with the questionable 
conduct going unchecked.  Alternatively, over-zealous enforcement 
may deter competition and produce inefficient responses by 
 
(“In current circumstances, companies competing in the market have to choose 
either to exceed the limits or suffer a competitive disadvantage.”). 
 261. See Posner, supra note 249, at 1720 (discussing morality and norms 
that “reflect nonefficiency and, more generally, non-consequentialist values”); 
see, e.g., Kahan, supra note 259, at 357-59 (noting that “individuals tend to 
adapt their moral convictions to those of their peers” and are more likely to 
violate or evade laws if they perceive their peers are doing so).  See generally 
Posner, supra note 259, at 1099-1102 (distinguishing “self-interest,” in 
consumer choice theory, from “greed,” which describes “excessive bodily 
appetites or an excessive longing for purchasing power” and “carries with it a 
moral charge”). 
 262. See ELLICKSON, supra note 250, 213-19 (outlining gradual escalation of 
force against norm violators, from notice, to gossip, to physical seizure and 
destruction of measured amount of deviant’s assets); Cooter, supra note 249, at 
1668-69 (“Informal sanctions like gossip and ostracism are cheap pain” which 
“increase the expected cost of violating the norm, which increases conformity to 
it.”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 631-49 (1996) (listing and discussing various shaming penalties); Posner & 
Rasmusen, supra note 250, at 370-72 (describing six types of sanctions for 
violating norms, including automatic sanctions, guilt, shame, informational 
sanctions, bilateral costly sanctions, and multilateral costly sanctions); see also 
John B. Owens, Have We No Shame?: Thoughts on Shaming, “White Collar” 
Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1047, 
1047-53 (2000) (evaluating Kahan’s arguments in favor of “shaming” sanctions 
for white collar criminals). 
 263. Kahan, supra note 262, at 591 (listing forms of punishment for violating 
laws and noting overwhelming societal preference for incarceration); Posner, 
supra note 249, at 1699 (defining a “norm” as “a rule that distinguishes 
desirable and undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to 
punish a person who engages in the undesirable behavior” and noting that “a 
private person sanctions the norm violator, whereas a state actor sanctions the 
law violator”); Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 250, at 369-70 (noting further 
that public institutions use “well-defined deliberative” processes to promulgate 
laws, and states’ enforcement ultimately carries a “threat of violence”). 
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regulated firms.264  In theory, a combination of formal and informal 
sanctions could provide an effective strategy for policing complex, 
regulated industries, such as the American health care market.265  
Industry insiders or competitors may be better or faster at 
identifying problems and imposing sanctions than government 
regulators.266  Moreover, regulators may be entrenched or impeded 
by bureaucratic red tape, factors which hamper their ability to 
effectively or quickly address changing industry practices and close 
problematic loopholes. 
Without waiting on formal action by regulators, the public 
responded to the Weakley report identifying the outlier issue by 
imposing informal sanctions, including shaming, gossip, ostracism, 
and disapproval on Tenet.  News reports and commentators cited 
Tenet’s questionable practices, explained (often erroneously) the 
correlation between charges and outlier payments, and questioned 
 
 264. See Cooper, supra note 254, at 16 (“Sometimes, even objectionable 
conduct simply should be tolerated . . . .”); Posner, supra note 249, at 1708 
(noting, in variant of Coase’s theorem, that inefficient laws may be superseded 
by efficient norms, “transferring the entitlement to the party who values it 
most”); id. at 1728-29 (discussing strategies for eliminating inefficient norms by 
creating incentives for violating them); Posner, supra note 259, at 1132 
(describing the role of judges in condemning “socially valuable if unsavory” 
behavior and “sow[ing] confusion for litigants and the public”); Posner & 
Rasmusen, supra note 250, at 380-81 (discussing interplay of government 
sanctions and norms and noting “that government should be careful about 
interfering with norm sanctions.  Sometimes just staying out of the way is the 
best policy.”). 
 265. See ELLICKSON, supra note 250, at 5-6 (discussing pervasiveness of 
social norms and noting that “[p]eople may supplement, and indeed preempt, 
the state’s rules with rules of their own”); Kahan, supra note 262, at 593 
(describing the ways that alternative sanctions may complement traditional 
criminal punishments, such as imprisonment and fines); Posner & Rasmusen, 
supra note 250, at 380 (suggesting that norms may be “more important than 
laws in deterring theft”); see also Krawiec, supra note 259, at 332-33 (describing 
the process of norm creation and role of “norm entrepreneurs” and summarizing 
Ellickson’s view that a new norm arises with an individual change agent); 
Posner, supra note 249, at 1708 (“Norms are usually enforced not just by the 
victim, but by third parties, such as the local villagers who impose sanctions 
(gossip, ostracism) on those who break the rules.”); Posner & Rasmusen, supra 
note 250, at 379 (regarding norm innovators and other influences on norm 
enforcement). 
 266. See ELLICKSON, supra note 250, at 177 (identifying characteristics of 
close-knit groups that tend to promote efficient norm production, including 
possessing information about norms and violations, reciprocal power, and ready 
sanctioning opportunities); see also Cooter, supra note 249, at 1643-47 
(introducing a theory of decentralized law, “which percolates up from the 
bottom”); Krawiec, supra note 259, at 325-32 (describing the development of 
financial traders’ norms). 
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the company’s morality.267  Potential merger partners and investors 
grew wary.  Tenet’s own shareholders perpetuated the shaming and 
gossip by gathering to discuss the company’s wrongdoing.  
Compromising their own portfolio values, the shareholders 
published a report tabulating Tenet’s potential liability for health 
care fraud at $6 billion.268  As a consequence, investors dumped their 
shares, resulting in additional informal sanctions in the form of 
ostracism and refusal to do business. 
After years of declining to police the outlier loophole or hospital 
charges, CMS responded to the post-Enron public pressure to 
crackdown on corporate “cheating.”  The agency reprioritized its 
enforcement agenda and initiated investigations of previously 
overlooked practices.269  Aiming to act quickly, the government relied 
on many of the same informal sanctions that the public had already 
begun imposing.  For example, CMS and Congress perpetuated the 
gossip and stigma on Tenet and other providers suspected of 
collecting high outlier payments by issuing strongly worded press 
releases and memoranda listing suspect factors for outlier abuse, 
publishing names of possible offenders, and initiating informal 
audits and investigations.  The government possesses additional 
enforcement methods unavailable to the public including civil fines 
and other formal sanctions for perceived outlier abuses.  Although 
the government’s authority to regulate hospital administration and 
charging practices is questionable,270 providers took the threats 
seriously, knowing the agency’s precedent for broadly interpreting 
the FCA to bring enforcement actions and potentially steep 
sanctions, including fines and program exclusion.271 
 
 267. See generally Laura B. Benko, On the Lookout; CMS Studies Outlier 
Billing Practices, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 9, 2002, at 14. 
 268. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing a meeting that 
estimated liability at $6 billion).  Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the 
Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2003) 
(suggesting that “corporate liability seems, on some level, unfair because it 
reduces the wealth of shareholders who themselves have rarely done anything 
wrong directly”); Editorial, Tenet’s Shareholder Ills, supra note 2, at A10 
(“Tenet Healthcare presented a shiny red apple to Medicare on Monday, hoping 
to get back in teacher’s good graces.  Too bad the fruit came from its 
shareholders’ tree.”). 
 269. See Hyman, supra note 225, at 550 (observing that “when 
administrative priorities change, conduct that everyone in the industry thought 
was acceptable can suddenly become exhibit A in a criminal and civil case”). 
 270. See supra part IV.B.1 (discussing CMS’s authority, or lack thereof, 
regarding health care providers’ and suppliers’ pricing). 
 271. Program exclusion results in loss of all Medicare revenue and 
publication of the excluded providers’ names in the Federal Register.  See supra 
notes 240-43 and accompanying text (discussing regulators’ use of FCA to 
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Faced with persistent non-legal sanctions and credible threats 
of costly legal sanctions, Tenet took various steps to dispel the 
negative attention.  Tenet’s response included press releases, Web 
site postings, and media interviews.272  At first, the company denied 
any wrongdoing with respect to outliers but later expressed 
contrition and overhauled its corporate policies and practices.273  
Specifically, Tenet attempted to reduce stigma and restore investor 
confidence by self-auditing its Medicare claims, restructuring 
management, and revamping pricing policies and outlier 
computation methodologies.274 
 As a rational corporate actor, Tenet weighed the suddenly 
increased potential costs of taking advantage of the outlier loophole 
against the benefits and reacted accordingly.  However, after the 
Enron dust settled, it appears that Tenet may have overreacted and 
self-policed itself into a marginal market position.  Ultimately, 
Tenet might have brought outlier payments in line with agency 
rules and guidance through corrective measures less debilitating 
than the concessions and changes that the public demanded through 
informal sanctions.  Enron and other readily available examples of 
corporate cheating and “creative accounting” caused the public to 
misperceive the threat posed by the Medicare outlier loophole.  The 
changes eventually implemented through formal amendment to the 
outlier regulations were not as radical or detrimental to providers’ 
operations than the changes driven by informal sanctions, self-
policing, and other fast-track regulatory initiatives.  Had regulators 
been insulated from the public’s emotional reaction and retributive 
desires, the agency could have conducted rational, deliberative 
corporate reform, preserving Tenet as a useful model for efficient, 
private, market health-care delivery. 
B. Costly Availability Errors 
Public reaction to news of Tenet’s disproportionately high 
outlier payments produced costly availability errors similar to the 
effects described in other regulatory contexts.275  Just as the public 
 
sanction excess prescription drug prices). 
 272. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 99; Interview by Cory Johnson, 
CNBC correspondent, with Trevor Feter, President and CEO of Tenet 
Healthcare  (Sept. 17, 2003). 
 273. See Press Release, supra note 99. 
 274. See Tenet’s Shareholder Ills, supra note 2, at A10. 
 275. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 691-703 (describing the Love 
Canal, Alar pesticide, and TWA Flight 800 episodes and regulatory responses); 
see also Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 4, at 1518-22 (describing 
anecdote-driven environmental legislation, with special reference to 
Superfund). 
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latched onto the Love Canal example to conclude that hazardous 
waste sites represented the nation’s top environmental problem—
above pesticides, smoking tobacco, water pollution, work-site 
chemicals and other threats276—the public latched onto the outlier 
loophole and for-profit medicine as the major flaw in the American 
health care system, rather than a whole host of other problems.  
Moreover, just as in the environmental context, consumers, 
investors, and the media failed to understand the range of factors, 
incentives, and risks associated with the complex regulatory 
scheme.  The public did not comprehend the intricate Medicare 
reimbursement methodology or the carefully balanced regulatory 
and private market incentives underlying hospital pricing and other 
business operations.  Drawing on widely publicized examples 
outside of the health care context such as Enron, Adelphia, and 
HealthSouth, the public pushed regulators to close the Medicare 
outlier loophole.277  The enforcement program drew resources away 
from other priorities and concerns to a relatively minor wrinkle in 
the reimbursement methodology, of which regulators were well 
aware and had repeatedly and rationally declined to iron out. 
Until the fall of 2001, Tenet rationally could have concluded 
that the potential exposure for targeting Medicare outlier payments 
was relatively low, even as a part of a deliberate strategy rather 
than just fortunately tapping into that revenue stream through 
robust pricing and product differentiation.  Medicare authorities had 
repeatedly acknowledged the flaws in the outlier formula.  They 
knew that hospitals could and were increasing outlier claims by 
increasing hospital charges.  However, regulators expressly declined 
to impose sanctions or close the outlier loophole.278  In 2002, Kenneth 
Weakley first identified the correlation between Tenet’s hospital 
charges and Medicare outlier payments.  Weakley served as an 
“availability entrepreneur,” offering the outlier formula as a ready 
explanation for Tenet’s unusually high profits.279  The media and the 
public, lacking independent understanding of hospital pricing and 
Medicare payments, readily adopted and perpetuated Weakley’s 
explanation initiating a cascade effect. 
The public failed to independently review relevant information 
before passing judgment and signaling others to adopt the same 
view.  At Weakley’s suggestion, the public focused its disapproval on 
 
 276. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 696-98 (describing the public’s 
persistent misperception regarding the threat posed by toxic waste sites, 
compared to other environmental risks). 
 277. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 2. 
 278. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 279. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 687-88. 
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Tenet’s high prices and the outlier formula.  Highly publicized 
lawsuits and news reports regarding hospitals charging full list 
prices and sending collection agents after indigent patients 
confirmed skeptics’ worst fears about for-profit “cowboy” medicine.  
In the post-Enron climate, the public scrutinized aggressive 
competitive strategies and unusually high profits for alternative 
explanations.  In Tenet’s case, the outlier loophole was as good an 
explanation as any other.  But the public’s visceral, emotional 
reaction was based on an incomplete understanding of the Medicare 
reimbursement methodology and the government’s historical 
noninterference policy, not to mention the complex interplay of 
private market incentives.  The availability cascade that Weakley’s 
report initiated, the media stoked, and the public carried forward, 
produced widespread availability errors. 
First, the public did not comprehend the pressures driving 
health care pricing.  In the current managed care era, hospital 
charges, or list prices, bear little relevance to how either private 
insurers or the government pay for health care services provided to 
their enrollees.  Private insurance companies typically negotiate 
fixed, prospective, bundled, or otherwise discounted payments with 
hospitals.  Charges serve as a reference point for negotiating the 
discounts or payment structures and, to that extent, reflect what the 
market will bear.  Likewise, government health care programs use 
special payment methodologies—such as PPS based on DRGs—that 
are largely divorced from actual costs or charges.280  As a result, the 
only patients left exposed to full, non-discounted prices are the self-
insured and uninsured.  At the surface, the idea of the government 
and private insurance companies negotiating steep discounts while 
indigent patients are saddled with full charges seems to be the 
height of callous private market greed. 
But the public failed to understand the Medicare regulations 
driving Tenet and other hospitals to increase charges and undertake 
to actually collect payment from indigent patients.  In particular, 
Medicare uniform charges and other cost reimbursement principles, 
combined with the outlier loophole, created the incentive.281  Nothing 
in the Medicare program rules prevented Tenet from increasing 
charges.  Moreover, the government lacks authority to interfere with 
hospital administration, including pricing.282  In addition, hospital 
 
 280. See FURROW, supra note 137, at 574. 
 281. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (explaining regulations 
requiring hospitals to establish uniform charges for all payors and using 
“charges actually imposed” or “collected” as the basis for Medicare 
reimbursement). 
 282. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (citing the statute and 
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administrators understood that offering discounts or sliding-scale 
fees to uninsured patients could violate Medicare “uniform charges” 
rules and invite potentially steep FCA sanctions.283  For charges to 
be considered “actual charges” for purposes of calculating Medicare 
payment for outliers and other cost-based adjustments under PPS, 
hospital administrators rationally believed that they actually had to 
attempt to collect payment from patients.  CMS recently issued 
guidance rebutting that interpretation of the regulations, but the 
view had been widely accepted in the industry.284 
Hospitals, such as those owned by Tenet, rationally responded 
to the regulatory incentives in establishing their charge structures.  
Because charges are largely irrelevant for determining private or 
government reimbursement, there was no market or regulatory 
consequence for increasing charges, even if those prices were 
inflated or fictional.  List prices could be super-competitive with no 
associated decline in demand because no one was actually paying 
list prices.  Contrary to the public’s perceptions, Tenet’s pricing 
strategy was not a clear example of naked greed, “turbocharging,” or 
price gouging.  A complex mix of private market and regulatory 
factors created incentives for Tenet’s strong and robust charges.  
Nevertheless, under pressure of informal sanctions and agency audit 
and enforcement activity, Tenet voluntarily altered various business 
strategies and internal policies, including its price structure and 
outlier calculation. The damages compromised the company’s 
market advantage and contravened other Medicare rules and 
policies.285 
 Another judgment error that the public and media perpetuated 
 
describing the traditional non-interference policy). 
 283. Offering discounts, in particular, could also be considered “illegal 
remuneration” offered to induce a patient referral under the anti-kickback 
statute, if the patient was a federal health care program enrollee.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b (2000).  But because the indigent patients in question generally had 
no form of health insurance, including government insurance, this statute likely 
would not be implicated.   
 284. CMS addressed the uninsured charges issue through informal policy 
statements, rather than formal amendments, because the agency believed the 
statements reflected the existing rules, not a rule change.  See supra note 221 
and accompanying text.   
 285. In addition to arguably violating the uniform charges principle by 
discounting prices to uninsured patients, Tenet’s voluntary outlier formula 
modifications arguably violate the rule that only Medicare FIs have authority to 
revise a provider-specific RCC.  See supra note 167.  Federal regulations 
expressly require FIs—not providers—to calculate the provider-specific RCCs 
annually.  Until recently, there was no allowance for mid-year updates, 
adjustments, or provisions for using data from tentative or non-final cost 
reports.  42 C.F.R. § 412.84(h) (2004). 
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was the repeated criticism that Tenet collected a “disproportionate” 
share of Medicare outlier payments.286  By “disproportionate,” critics 
had in mind the five-to-six percentage target level of outlier 
payments specified in the Medicare statute.  Specifically, the Act 
requires annual program-wide outlier payments to represent five-to-
six percent of all standard, DRG payments to all Medicare providers 
in the aggregate.287  The target does not refer to individual 
providers.288  The fact that Tenet’s outlier payment percentage was 
higher than the statutory five-to-six-percent range—as high as 
twenty-five percent289—misapprehends the meaning and purpose of 
the statutory provision.  The statutory range is a target for the 
percentage of the total Medicare budget allocated to outlier cases.290  
Relying on that provision to suggest that Tenet received a 
“disproportionate” share of outlier payments because it received 
more than six percent represents a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the statute. 
The outlier payment methodology does not anticipate equitable 
distribution, with all providers receiving roughly proportional 
shares of the limited pool of outlier dollars.  It is both possible and 
expected that some hospitals will receive no outlier adjustments 
while other hospitals will claim a high proportion of outlier cases 
relative to non-outlier, or standard DRG cases.  In particular, 
certain facilities, such as research-oriented teaching hospitals and 
large urban trauma centers, tend to have relatively high numbers of 
cases qualifying for outlier adjustments because they provide 
sophisticated, resource-intensive services.291  Those services result in 
higher costs per case than cases at small, rural hospitals, or 
hospitals not offering high-technology, specialty care.  The tendency 
of one type of hospital to receive more outlier cases than another 
does not necessarily suggest improper conduct by the hospital.  
 
 286. See, e.g., Bartels, Examining, supra note 73 (“Tenet hospitals have 
received an unusually large share of such extra [Medicare outlier] payments.”); 
Editorial, The Real Tenet Scandal, supra note 2 (“We’re told that Tenet came 
under regulatory scrutiny only when competitors, worried they weren’t getting 
their fair share of outliers, snitched.”); see also CMS, INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 
186. 
 287. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (2000). 
 288. Id. 
 289. See, e.g., White, supra note 121 (noting that Tenet’s “special payments” 
accounted for as much as twenty-five percent of the company’s total Medicare 
revenue for the previous year, compared to “average for major hospital chains 
[which] has been estimated to be in the 5%-to-6% range”). 
 290. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv). 
 291. See, e.g., Abelson, supra note, at C1 (stating that teaching hospitals and 
other large hospital chains generally receive more outlier payments because of 
kinds of cases they typically treat). 
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Tenet facilities, in particular, had a high case mix of complex cases 
because they targeted the market for specialized, high-technology 
treatment.292  But the public misunderstood both the statutory 
provision and the correlation between the type of treatment offered 
at a particular hospital and the likelihood of outlier cases resulting. 
In addition, contrary to public perceptions, Tenet’s strategy of 
targeting complex cases was legal and consistent with Medicare 
program rules and regulations.  Congress specifically authorized 
payment adjustments for extraordinarily expensive cases because 
policymakers recognized that certain cases, “because of severity of 
illness or complicating conditions,” would not be adequately 
compensated under the DRG payment methodology.293  Congress 
was concerned that providers might avoid treating the Medicare 
program’s sickest and neediest patients and approved extra 
payment to correct the disincentive.  Tenet’s hospitals did not avoid 
treating the hard cases but actively sought them out, consistent 
with regulatory incentives. 
Moreover, the public failed to understand the nuances of the 
Medicare budget and limited outlier pool.  The overall Medicare 
budget is not depleted just because one hospital receives a higher 
percentage of outlier cases than another hospital.  Outlier payments 
represent a fixed, budget-neutral item under the Medicare program.  
By statute, they will not exceed six percent of the total annual 
Medicare inpatient budget.294  Even if one Medicare provider, such 
as Tenet, collects a relatively high percentage of outlier payments, 
there is no impact on overall Medicare program costs or depletion of 
Medicare funds allocated to standard DRG payments.  Inferring 
wrongdoing from the fact that Tenet hospitals’ outlier payments 
exceeded six percent of standard DRG cases reflects the public’s 
fundamental misunderstanding of the controlling law and 
regulatory incentives. 
But in the wake of Enron, the public suddenly demanded that 
CMS shift regulatory priorities without regard to the actual risks 
posed by the outlier problem or secondary effects of closing the 
loophole.  In addition to widespread availability errors that distorted 
the regulatory agenda, the public exacerbated the problem by 
 
 292. See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Bay Area Pays Dearly for Tenet, Other Hospitals 
Charge About Half As Much, Data Show, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15, 2002, at A1 
(quoting Tenet spokesman Greg Harrison: “We’re treating more-complex cases 
or sicker patients and more of them. . . . That accounts for some of the 
disparity.”). 
 293. S. REP. NO. 98-23, at 51 (1983) (“The committee amendment, therefore, 
requires the Secretary to provide additional payment for cases which are 
extraordinarily costly to treat, relative to other cases within the DRG.”). 
 294. Id. 
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applying informal sanctions, which inappropriately raised the 
stakes for providers that had been setting prices under the outlier 
loophole, with little risk over many years.  Tenet adjusted its risk-
reward calculus to respond to public perceptions and informal 
sanctions but, in doing so, compromised the availability of highly 
demanded medical services.295  Tenet’s business strategy for 
innovative products provided high-quality specialty care to a 
targeted sub-market of health care consumers and offered valuable 
models for market-based health care delivery.  Tenet’s dramatic 
decline in the wake of Enron demonstrates the dangers of allowing 
the public to set regulatory priorities based on incomplete 
information and inaccurate judgments. 
C. Virtues of Bureaucracy 
Regulations reflect reasoned policy decisions developed though 
formal, deliberative processes.  Administrative agencies are 
specialists at obtaining and processing information.  Institutional 
structures guide the process and ensure that all relevant 
information is collected and considered.  Virtues, such as 
rationalization, expertise, insulation, and authority are inherent in 
the regulatory scheme.296  Specifically, under notice and comment 
rulemaking, agencies like CMS publish proposed rules; solicit, 
review, and respond to public comments by the public; assess and 
report on the budgetary impact of any changes; and incorporate and 
revise interested constituents’ proposals before issuing a final 
program regulation or amendment.297  In particular, CMS annually 
 
 295. See Khanna, supra note 268, at 1225 (discussing the rationale for 
corporate liability standards and suggesting that for socially appropriate 
amount of particular good to be produced, the price of the good should reflect its 
true social costs, including potential liability). 
 296. See BREYER, supra note 6, at 61-63 (describing four virtues of 
administrative systems and advocating a group of special civil servants to bring 
uniformity and rationality to decisionmaking in highly technical areas); Kuran 
& Sunstein, supra note 5, at 746-57 (advocating “comprehensive rationality” 
and describing institutional safeguards against harmful cascades, including 
new governmental structures to insulate civil servants from mass demands for 
regulatory changes). 
 297. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 335-
36 (2002) (describing administrative law theory justifications for legitimacy of 
administrative agency rulemaking, including the requirements that agencies 
stay within the bounds of statutory delegations and engage in reasoned 
decisionmaking by soliciting public comments, carefully considering issues 
raised, and rationally justifying policy choices) (quoting Johnathan Weinberg, 
ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 221-22 (2000)).  See 
generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking 
provision). 
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updates inpatient PPS rates, incorporating price and cost changes, 
utilization patterns, treatment methods, and inflation factors.298  
The agency also regularly reviews every aspect of the Medicare 
payment system, updates prices for all Medicare-reimbursed 
services, and considers other changes to improve program 
operations, efficiency, and payment accuracy.299 
Medicare authorities on several previous occasions evaluated 
comments identifying various flaws in the outlier payment 
methodology.  Through the institutional structures of formal 
rulemaking, the agency carefully considered the issues and potential 
flaws in the outlier formula.  Over the years, the agency accepted 
some suggested changes and rejected others, each time rationally 
justifying its policy decisions.  The essential elements of the outlier 
regulations, including reference to hospitals’ actual charges and 
unfettered discretion to set charges, were retained.300  But in late 
2001 and early 2002, after years of acquiescence, Medicare 
authorities responded to public pressure after Enron and imposed 
informal sanctions.301  Regulatory priorities were set by availability 
entrepreneurs, such as Kenneth Weakley, and availability cascades 
that resulted from the Enron fall-out led to the public’s identifying 
the outlier loophole to explain Tenet’s remarkable profitability, 
without fully understanding the regulatory and market incentives 
that drove Tenet’s business strategies. 
 Without citing any laws or regulations that might be violated, 
CMS in late 2002 announced an outlier initiative, conducted 
primarily through sub-regulatory enforcement and policy setting.302  
The agency issued memoranda, guidance statements, and informal 
audits suggesting that providers should reduce in their charges and 
otherwise adjust practices with respect to the outlier loophole.303  
The agency’s strategy of informal action rather than formal 
rulemaking resulted in unpredictability and inefficient self-policing 
by targeted providers like Tenet.  In 2003, CMS eventually amended 
the outlier regulations through formal rulemaking, a process that 
reconciled the controlling law, justified the changes, and balanced 
competing incentives.304  The changes called for by CMS’s final 
 
 298. 42 C.F.R. § 412.8(b) (2004). 
 299. Id. § 412.60(e). 
 300. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (describing several 
years’ annual PPS updates and discussion of outlier adjustment). 
 301. See CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170. 
 302. See supra Section IV.A.3 (discussing the CMS outlier initiative). 
 303. See CMS, INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 186; CMS, NOTICE, supra note 170. 
 304. See Medicare Program; Change in Methodology for Determining 
Payment for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under Acute Care 
Hospital Inpatient and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment 
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outlier regulations were far less radical than the response the public 
demanded through informal sanctions.305 
Unfortunately, by the time formal regulations were issued, 
Tenet had already reacted to public pressure and adjusted its 
business practices to comply with emerging corporate norms 
favoring fairness and self-restraint over aggressive competition and 
profit-maximization.  The changes Tenet implemented compromised 
the company’s strong market position.  Tenet executives who had 
been most closely identified with the outlier issue were removed, 
without regard to their overall contributions and talents, apart from 
Medicare reimbursement strategies.306  The company appointed new 
officers and board members, including a physician and a former 
auditor, with expertise suggesting renewed commitment to 
professionalism and accountability.307  Tenet preemptively adopted a 
revised approach to calculating its own Medicare outlier claims, 
resulting in a substantial payment reduction, even though CMS had 
not yet implemented any changes to the payment formula.308  The 
company also changed its pricing and debt-collection policies for 
charges incurred by uninsured and underinsured patients.309  All of 
those changes reflected contrition more than rational business 
decisions.310  Tenet’s self-corrective policies caused a dramatic, 
persistent decline in share value.311  As it turned out, many of the 
changes would not have been required under the final outlier 
amendments. 
The formal amendments narrowed but did not entirely close the 
loophole.  In particular, CMS declined any changes to the rules 
regarding hospital charges or the fixed outlier pool.312  The agency’s 
 
Systems; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494, 34,496 (June 9, 2003) (to be codified 
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412). 
 305. See supra notes 193-97 (describing final outlier amendments). 
 306. Debora Vrana & Ronald D. White, Tenet Names Kangas as Chairman, 
L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at C1; Ronald D. White, Tenet’s Top Legal Counsel 
Resigns, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2003, at C1. 
 307. Andrew Pollack, Tenet Vows Improvements in Patient Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 24, 2003, at C5; Vrana & White, supra note 307. 
 308. Pasztor, supra note 120, at B7. 
 309. Lisa Girion, Tenet Set to Discount Charges to Uninsured, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2004, at C1. 
 310. See Pasztor, supra note 173, at B7 (quoting an analyst’s observation 
that Tenet officials are “trying to show they are good public citizens”); White, 
supra note 290, at 2D (indicating that Administrator Scully was “pleasantly 
surprised” by Tenet’s actions and said that the company took a “pretty 
honorable step”). 
 311. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (detailing Tenet’s market 
decline). 
 312. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective 
W06-WEEKS VERSION 2.DOC 12/6/2005  10:18 AM 
1282 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
restraint respects the government’s limited authority under the 
Medicare statute as well as the competing regulatory and private 
incentives driving health care markets.  The amendments instead 
focused on problems associated with RCC lag time and statewide 
average RCC.  Specifically, the regulations authorized FIs to use 
updated but non-final cost report data to reduce RCC lag-time and 
eliminated reversion to the statewide RCC for hospital-specific 
RCCs falling below the established parameters.313 
Separately, the agency issued statements affirming the 
understanding that Medicare LCC, cost apportionment, and other 
regulations do not “require” hospitals to charge and collect full list 
prices from indigent patients.314  Offering discounts or sliding-scale 
rates based on ability to pay is fully consistent with Medicare policy, 
according to CMS.  Nevertheless, CMS did not impose Medicare 
price controls or cap the level of Medicare outlier payments that a 
particular hospital could claim.  Those regulations, if implemented, 
would not only violate CMS’s noninterference policy but also impair 
hospitals’ ability to negotiate competitive prices in the private 
market and develop specialized, targeted health care services.  Post-
Enron public perceptions frowned on profitability and favored self-
restraint.  But agency regulations retained a measured view of 
health care markets and did not trample efficient profit-
maximization incentives.  Hospitals remain free to establish charges 
based on what the market will bear.  The recently enacted MMA, 
which includes the most significant changes to Medicare since the 
program’s inception, affirms the traditional noninterference policy 
on health care pricing.315  That MMA provision, like the outlier 
loophole, has attracted considerable criticism as naked rent-seeking 
by pharmaceutical and insurance industries.316  The criticism may be 
 
Payment System and Calendar Year 2004 Payment Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,398, 
63,460 (Nov. 7, 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410, 419).  
 313. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text (summarizing changes 
to outlier payment methodology). 
 314. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (describing the Medicare 
Part D prescription drug benefit). 
 316. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (discussing the MMA’s 
noninterference provision); see also DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 33 (2000) 
(noting that the “term [rent-seeking] was coined to describe competition for 
government favors”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 n.3 
(5th ed. 1998) (“The tendency of an expected gain to be translated into costs 
through competitive efforts is called rent-seeking. . . .”); MAXWELL L. STEARNS, 
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 120-24 (1997) 
(describing the interest group theory of rent seeking); James M. Buchanan, 
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING 
SOCIETY 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (“The term rent seeking is 
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warranted, but any changes to the policy should be conducted 
through rational bureaucratic processes, shielded from public 
emotions and judgment errors. 
The proliferation of corporate wrongdoing and accounting 
scandals beginning with Enron in late 2001, drove the public to 
identify Tenet’s high prices and debt collection practices as “unfair” 
or cheating under an identifiable Medicare loophole. Without fully 
considering the costs of its informal enforcement campaign, the 
public imposed sanctions and pressured hospitals to dramatically 
alter practices that previously drew tacit approval or even praise.  
By contrast, CMS comprehensively evaluated the various competing 
regulatory and market incentives underlying hospital prices, 
product and service differentiation, patient mix, and other factors 
influencing the level of outlier cases that a particular hospital 
receives.  The Medicare program is notoriously complex, and the 
outlier adjustment is just one small strand in an intricate web.  The 
formal administrative rulemaking process that eventually occurred 
allowed the agency to assess the impact of tugging on one strand of 
the Medicare web on the overall health care system.  That formal 
approach to closing Medicare loopholes is preferable to the 
availability cascade and informal reactions to Tenet and the outlier 
issue. 
Perhaps closing the outlier loophole would have been the most 
direct and efficient regulatory response.  Eliminating the outlier 
adjustment altogether removes the questionable incentive for charge 
inflation.  Closing the loophole would also enhance predictability for 
the Medicare program and participating providers, who would 
receive only the fixed DRG amount, even for extraordinarily 
expensive cases.  Just as Medicare authorities eliminated the day 
outlier adjustment, they could eliminate the cost outlier adjustment.  
Congress’ concern that eliminating cost outliers would result in 
hospitals avoiding the hard cases would likely not occur because the 
system contains other payment adjustments and enforcement 
mechanisms to check that incentive.  First, outlier cases tend to 
occur with greater frequency at teaching hospitals, urban hospitals 
that treat a disproportionate share of underinsured patients, and 
sophisticated trauma centers, facilities that already receive 
Medicare adjustments to make up for their added costs.317  Also, 
 
designed to describe behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts 
to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus.”); Robert D. 
Tollison, Rent Seeking, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 315 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“Rent seeking is the socially costly 
pursuit of wealth transfers . . . .”). 
 317. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.105 (2004) (regarding special payment for hospitals 
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regulators update the average DRG payment amounts annually, 
using hospitals’ actual cost and charge data,318 meaning that the 
increased costs of treating particular cases or types of cases 
eventually become incorporated as average rather than 
extraordinary reimbursement levels.  Moreover, regulators have 
discretion to create new DRGs and could do so to provide additional 
payment for certain categories of high-cost cases.  Finally, 
regulatory quality-of-care standards319 and common law tort 
liability,320 to some extent, already police the incentive to avoid or 
under-serve needy patients. 
Medicare authorities may have opted to narrow but not close 
the loophole because closing it would require statutory 
amendment,321 a typically slower, more cumbersome process than 
revising regulations.  Or the agency may have determined that the 
extra payment continues to be a necessary incentive to avoid 
treating the hard cases.  As CMS continues to monitor the outlier 
issue and assess regulatory priorities and incentives, authorities 
may determine that the burdens of pursuing statutory amendment 
are worth the benefits of increased predictability and reduced 
program costs.  Formal institutions, administrative expertise, inter-
 
that incur indirect costs of graduate medical education), id. § 412.106(d) 
(regulations regarding special payment for hospitals that treat disproportionate 
share of low-income patients).  In particular: 
The indirect medical education adjustment recognizes that there are 
additional costs that teaching hospitals incur in connection with the 
presence of graduate medical education programs. Congress was 
concerned that teaching hospitals might be adversely affected by the 
implementation of [PPS] because these hidden costs would not be 
reflected in [PPS] payment rates as costs were standardized and the 
system moved toward a national payment rate applicable to all 
hospitals.   
Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment 
System and Fiscal Year 1986 Rates, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,681 (Sept. 3, 1985) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412). 
 318. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text (describing annual 
inpatient PPS updates). 
 319. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 424.13 (listing inpatient hospital Medicare 
conditions of participation), id. § 424.5(a)(ii) (excluding from coverage “services 
not reasonable and necessary”). 
 320. Under the common law, hospitals may be held liable for an individual 
physicians’ failure to provide adequate or appropriate medical treatment or 
other medical malpractice.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 
1987) (describing theories of hospitals’ vicarious liability, including enterprise 
liability, apparent authority, and non-delegable duty); Darling v. Charleston 
Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965) (describing hospitals’ 
independent duty to monitor physicians). 
 321. The Medicare outlier adjustment is found in 42 U.S.C.                            
§ 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i) (2000). 
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branch coordination, other processes insulated from public 
misperceptions and judgment errors will allow lawmakers to 
address Medicare loopholes through measured, deliberative analysis 
of relevant risks.322 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In complex regulatory programs like Medicare, loopholes are 
inevitable.  Regulators may lack the resources to keep up and to 
quickly and tightly close loopholes as they become apparent.  But 
without the risk of sanctions, the potential rewards for exploiting 
loopholes increase.  Accordingly, among rational actors, we can 
predict that the incidence of questionable conduct also will increase.  
Therefore, public pressure and informal sanctions could potentially 
enhance formal regulations.  In the aftermath of Enron, however, 
the public latched on to the Medicare outlier loophole as yet another 
readily available example of corporate fraud and “creative 
accounting” without fully understanding the complex interplay of 
private market and regulatory incentives for health care.  Public 
perceptions created an availability cascade, focused on the outlier 
loophole as the key problem needing to be addressed.  The cascade of 
blame led to informal sanctions.  Tenet and other targeted health 
care providers internalized the sanctions and dismantled promising 
models for private market health care delivery.  The chain reaction 
eventually pressured regulators to respond with investigations, 
enforcement initiative, and hastily implemented reforms. 
In that climate, health care providers could not rationally 
evaluate the risks of engaging in certain conduct and adjust 
practices to conform, short of ceasing altogether or drastically 
overhauling core strategies and operations.  The unfortunate result 
of the post-Enron health care public reactions and administrative 
reforms was the dismantling of a promising private market model 
for health care delivery.  Health care pricing and third-party 
reimbursement is a highly technical web of incentives that requires 
a coordinated agency response.  Moreover, the current trend in 
health care reform emphasizes privatization and market 
competition to increase efficiency and reduce health care costs.  
Those measures are doomed if widespread judgment errors, based 
on the latest news report of Wall Street executives gone bad and 
 
 322. See BREYER, supra note 6, at 61-63 (describing the “virtues of 
bureaucracy”); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 746-59 (discussing 
institutional safeguards against harmful cascades).  See generally Sunstein, 
supra note 6, at 934 (advocating cost-benefit analysis to correct cognitive errors, 
including availability cascades).  Cf. Abramowicz, supra note 5 (analyzing 
whether informational markets could improve agency decisionmaking). 
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incomplete understanding of the complex health care system, are 
allowed to drive regulatory responses.  Instead, agencies should be 
insulated from public pressures and given the space to develop and 
deliberate over rational policies for policing loopholes, while 
carefully assessing the risks of privatizing or market-based 
strategies to improve the nation’s health care system. 
 
